Ballot Fees as Impermissible Qualifications for Federal Office by Brown, Mark R.
American University Law Review
Volume 54 | Issue 5 Article 2
2005




Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brown, Mark R. "Ballot Fees as Impermissible Qualifications for Federal Office." American University Law Review 54, no.4 (2005):
1283-1350.
Ballot Fees as Impermissible Qualifications for Federal Office
This article is available in American University Law Review: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol54/iss5/2
BROWN OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006 2:42:19 PM 
 
1283 
BALLOT FEES AS IMPERMISSIBLE 
QUALIFICATIONS FOR FEDERAL OFFICE 
MARK R. BROWN* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction .............................................................................................1283 
I. A Brief History of Qualifications and Ballots ..............................1286 
A. The First Hundred Years .......................................................1286 
1. Ballots ..............................................................................1286 
2. Qualifications...................................................................1290 
3. Nominating procedures....................................................1294 
B.   Post-Bellum Changes in the Electoral Process ......................1296 
II. The Modern Statutory Framework ...............................................1306 
III.  Comparing Property Qualifications ..............................................1313 
A. Equal Protection Limitations on  
 Property Qualifications..........................................................1314 
B. The Federal Qualifications Clauses .......................................1317 
   IV. Ballot Fees as Qualifications ........................................................1329 
A. Fees as Property.....................................................................1330 
B. The Problem of Size ..............................................................1336 
C. Comparing Ballot Fees ..........................................................1340 
Conclusion ...............................................................................................1352 
INTRODUCTION 
BAL’LǑT, n. [It. ballotta; Fr. ballotte, a little ball.] 
1.  originally, a ball used in voting.  Ballots were of two colors, white 
and black, the former being used for an affirmative and the latter for a 
negative vote. 
                                                          
 *  Newton D. Baker/Baker & Hostetler Professor of Law, Capital University.  Lead 
Counsel in Biener v. Calio, 125 S. Ct. 55 (2004) (certiorari denied).  I thank Capital 
University for funding this project through a generous research grant and by hosting a 
workshop on its results.  I also thank Mark Strasser, Elizabeth Kuhn, Steven Biener, and 
Charles Wompold for their help and valuable comments.  All errors remain my own.     
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2.  a preprinted or written ticket, paper, etc., by which a vote is 
registered. 
3.  the act or method of voting, especially secret voting by the use of 
ballots or voting machines. 
4.  the entire number of votes cast at an election. 
5.  a list of people running for office; a ticket.1 
Webster’s Dictionary reveals that “ballot” has enjoyed several meanings 
throughout history.2  Originally, the term was understood to reference the 
small white and black balls that registered votes.3  Today, while sometimes 
used to describe the act of voting, the term more commonly describes the 
collection of candidates running for office.4  Eligible persons who have 
expressed a sufficient interest in an elected position are said to be “on the 
ballot.”5 
How one goes about getting “on the ballot” is the focus of this Article.  
Most states today require that major-party candidates for state and federal 
offices survive political primaries in order to qualify for general election 
ballots.6  Access to the primary ballot, in turn, is conditioned by most states 
on the payment of filing fees.7  While precise amounts vary, these fees are 
not often trivial.  Federal offices, in particular, are regularly conditioned on 
fees that reach thousands of dollars.8 
My thesis is that these ballot fees, when applied to federal elected 
officials, violate the U.S. Constitution.  Specifically, I argue that filing fees 
for elected federal officials—the President, Senators, and members of the 
House—violate the Qualifications Clauses found in Articles I and II of the 
Constitution.  According to Article I, Senators and House members need 
only meet age, state residence, and U.S. citizenship tests.9  Article II 
provides that the President need only meet age, U.S. residence, and United 
States citizenship tests.10  None of these federal officials can be required to 
own property, let alone pay it over to government, in order to qualify for 
their positions.  Filing fees are nothing more than property qualifications.  
                                                          
 1. WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 143 (2d ed. 1983). 
 2. See id. (demonstrating that the meaning of “ballot,” originally thought of as the 
combination of a white and black ball used for voting, now also denotes a preprinted or 
written ticket by which a vote is registered, the act or method of voting, the entire number of 
votes cast at an election, and a list of people running for office). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See infra notes 158-162 and accompanying text (stating that all but four states have 
divided the election process into primaries followed by a general election). 
 7. See infra notes 153-195 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra notes 113-129 and accompanying text. 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. I. 
 10. U.S. CONST. art. II. 
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They not only require property ownership; they divest candidates of the 
property they own. 
Of course, everyone knows that successful political campaigns are 
expensive.  One estimate has successful Senatorial candidates in 2000 
spending, on average, over $7 million on their campaigns.11  Successful 
House candidates spent, on average, over $800,000 on their campaigns.12  
Total campaign expenditures for the 469 or so federal offices at stake in 
2000, including the presidency, approached $2 billion.13  When compared 
with the large cash outlays needed to win federal elections, even a $10,000 
fee may seem reasonable. 
Fees, moreover, are often charged for public services.  Drivers’ licenses, 
marriage licenses, parking meters and toll roads are frequently encountered 
examples.  Even peaceful dispute resolution, one of the foundations of 
civilized societies, is commonly conditioned on user fees.14  Simply put, 
user fees are a regular, some might say necessary, nuisance in the 
American scheme of government. 
Because user fees are ubiquitous and campaigns expensive, my argument 
might appear ambitious.  Convincing skeptics that abandoning ballot fees is 
useful or constitutionally necessary can prove a difficult task.  Money, after 
all, could still control many (or most) electoral outcomes.  Equally 
obstructive non-monetary mechanisms might also evolve to block 
commoners from federal ballots. 
My naivety does not blind me to these possibilities.  However, I am not 
yet so cynical to believe that these results are inevitable or desirable.  
Instead, I have to believe that an American political system that remains 
theoretically open to all candidates is preferable to one that frankly equates 
money with electoral value.  In my mind, the current system is no different 
from waiving Duke into the Final Four every basketball season.  I refuse to 
believe that a competitive process can be so predictable as to be 
                                                          
 11. See JOSEPH E. CANTOR, ELECTIONS 2004:  THE STATE OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE, US 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE’S BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS, at  
http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/election04/campaign$.htm (last visited June 22, 2005) 
(on file with the American University Law Review) (reporting successful Senatorial 
campaigns averaging $7.4 million dollars in expenses). 
 12. See id. (documenting that the average successful House campaign costs $849,000). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Both state and federal courts generally charge plaintiffs filing fees before they can 
proceed to trial.  The Supreme Court has found that such fees in civil courts do not violate 
the federal Constitution.  See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973) 
(declaring that filing fees for federal bankruptcy proceedings do not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973) (sustaining appellate 
filing fees for adverse welfare decisions).  Only when some other fundamental interest, such 
as familial rights or basic liberty, is at stake are user fees constitutionally impermissible.  
See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 104 (1996) (holding that a parent is entitled to a 
free transcript in order to appeal a decision terminating parental rights); Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (finding that a criminal defendant is entitled to a free transcript to 
pursue an appeal). 
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dispensable, whether on basketball courts, in courts of law, or in the 
political marketplace.  Let everyone play and see who wins.  People might 
be surprised by the outcomes. 
This Essay proceeds in four parts.  Part I explains the American history 
of ballots, qualifications, and filing fees.  Part II outlines the present 
structure and legal landscape of ballot fees in the United States.  Part III 
assesses the constitutional problems that surround property qualifications 
on both sides of the ballot.  Part IV then makes use of the history, 
constitutional debates, and Supreme Court precedent surrounding ballots, 
qualifications, and electoral fees to present a normative constitutional 
critique of current law.  In sum, I argue that the founding generation did not 
intend to allow states to add ownership requirements to the qualifications 
spelled out in Articles I and II.  Though it is impossible to say that the 
Framers rejected ballot fees, one can conclude that ballot fees prove 
inconsistent with the meaning and spirit of the federal Qualifications 
Clauses. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF QUALIFICATIONS AND BALLOTS 
A. The First Hundred Years 
1.  Ballots 
Colonial America used voice voting and the showing of hands, as well as 
written ballots, for its collective decision making.15  For this reason, voting 
in the colonies “was not a private affair, but an open, public decision, 
witnessed by all and improperly influenced by some.”16 
To the extent paper ballots were used in the colonies and emerging 
                                                          
 15. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 200 (1992) (stating that “[d]uring the 
colonial period, many government officials were elected by the viva voce method or by the 
showing of hands, as was the custom in most parts of Europe”) (citing ELDON EVANS, A 
HISTORY OF THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 1-6 (The Univ. of 
Chicago Press 1917); JOSEPH HARRIS, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, ELECTION 
ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 15-16 (1934); JERROLD RUSK, THE EFFECT OF THE 
AUSTRALIAN BALLOT REFORM ON SPLIT TICKET VOTING:  1876-1908, 8-11 (Univ. of 
Michigan 1968)).  Voice votes were common in the colonies, even when proxy voting by 
paper ballot was allowed.  CORTLANDT F. BISHOP, HISTORY OF ELECTIONS IN THE AMERICAN 
COLONIES 140 (Columbia College 1893).  Because the common law precluded proxy voting 
altogether, it was not uncommon for elected bodies in colonial America to be selected by 
voice vote.  Id.  The choice of written ballots over voice votes in colonial America depended 
on a combination of geography, philosophy and ownership.  Id. at 98-99.  The New England 
colonies, which were heavily influenced by Puritan thought, commonly allowed proxy 
voting, and hence written ballots.  Id. at 98.  Proprietary colonies (Delaware, Pennsylvania 
and the Carolinas) also used written ballots.  Id. at 99.  New York, Virginia, Georgia, 
Maryland, and New Jersey, on the other hand, shunned ballots in favor of the system used 
by the English House of Commons (which did not implement paper ballots until 1872).   Id. 
at 98. 
 16. Burson, 504 U.S. at 200. 
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states, they were not pre-printed by government.17  Rather, they were 
produced by the electors themselves, or by someone acting at an elector’s 
behest.18  One might say that the electoral ballots used by the founding 
generation of Americans were informal at best.19  They were not uniform, 
were not official, did not include lists of candidates, and were not regulated 
by government.20 
By the dawn of the Constitutional Convention, the newly emancipated 
states had uniformly adopted paper ballots.21  Because the transparency of 
voice voting facilitated bribery and coercion, states discovered that secrecy 
was important to the integrity of their elections.22  Paper ballots, which 
could confidentially register votes, thus became the rule in post-
Constitution America.  Only Kentucky retained voice voting for any 
prolonged period of time following ratification of the Constitution.23 
Still, the ballots that came into vogue in the latter part of the eighteenth 
century were not pre-printed by government or official in any sense of the 
word.  Voters simply “marked [their selections] in the privacy of their 
homes, and then brought them to the polls for counting.”24 
By the middle of the nineteenth century, as political parties emerged25 
and elections became more complex, voters began using “preprinted tickets 
offered by political parties.”26  These pre-printed tickets “were often 
printed with flamboyant colors, distinctive designs, and emblems so that 
they could be recognized at a distance.”27 
Unfortunately, the distinctive nature of these ballots subverted secrecy 
and facilitated untoward influence in the voting booth.28  In an effort to 
                                                          
 17. See generally EVANS, supra note 15, at 1-6 (noting that in New England, the use of 
the paper ballot was not meant to ensure secrecy). 
 18. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 200 (observing that voters handwrote their ballots at home 
and then brought them to the polls for counting). 
 19. See generally EVANS, supra note 15 passim (comparing the voting methods present 
in the New England, Middle Atlantic, Southern, North Central, and Western states). 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 200 (observing that the opportunities to bribe voters due to 
the public nature of the viva voce system led to its demise). 
 22. Id. 
 23. See LIONEL E. FREDMAN, THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT:  THE STORY OF AN AMERICAN 
REFORM 20 (Michigan State Univ. Press 1968) (“All but one of the new state constitutions 
of the era of the Revolution required ballot papers.  Kentucky clung to oral voting even after 
the Civil War, otherwise the system had become general.”); see also Burson, 504 U.S. at 
200 (reporting that most states adopted the paper ballot within twenty years of the formation 
of the Union). 
 24. Burson, 504 U.S. at 200. 
 25. See JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF 
POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA 97 (1995) (recognizing Martin Van Buren’s political 
organizing in support of Andrew Jackson’s 1828 presidential campaign as the beginning of 
party politics in the United States). 
 26. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 446 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 27. Burson, 504 U.S. at 200. 
 28. Id. at 200-01. 
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battle the systemic bribery and coercion that surrounded elections, in 1888 
“the Louisville, Kentucky, municipal government, the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, and the State of New York adopted the Australian [ballot] 
system” to help guarantee ballots’ secrecy.29  As explained by Justice 
Kennedy in his dissenting opinion in Burdick v. Takushi,30 “[s]tate-
prepared ballots were considered to be a progressive reform to reduce 
fraudulent election practices.”31  The distinctive pre-printed ballots offered 
by political parties32 were abandoned in favor of official, identical ballots.33  
Because party operatives could no longer be sure how votes were cast, 
many abusive party practices, like bribery and coercion, were thus 
avoided.34  As a result, by 1896, a vast majority of states had turned to pre-
printed paper ballots.35  By 1916, the Australian pre-printed paper ballot 
had become the universal norm throughout the United States.36 
The development of pre-printed paper ballots in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century supplied government its first real opportunity to limit 
the number of candidates running for office.  Qualifications, after all, can 
only do so much.  Indeed, a limited field was an implicit assumption behind 
the adoption of pre-printed ballots.  Following Illinois’s adoption of the 
Australian ballot in 1891, for example, the Illinois Supreme Court observed 
that “[i]t is manifest that . . . nominations of candidates whose names shall 
appear upon the ballot must be regulated in some way, otherwise the whole 
scheme would become incapable of execution.”37 
                                                          
 29. See id. at 202-03 (observing that the Australian system was the best way to secure 
secrecy in elections because it provided for an official ballot containing all the candidates’ 
names and required polling booths). 
 30. 504 U.S. 428 (1992). 
 31. Id. at 446 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 32. Burson, 504 U.S. at 200-01. 
 33. See id. at 202-03 (explaining that these ballots contained all the candidates). 
 34. See id. at 202 (explaining that uniform ballots and polling booths introduced by the 
Australian election reforms helped to ensure secrecy). 
 35. See id. at 204-05 (noting that reform measures taken by several of the states “set off 
a rapid and widespread adoption of the Australian system in the United States”).  “By 1896, 
almost 90 percent of the States had adopted the Australian system.  This accounted for 92 
percent of the national electorate.”  Id.  See THE CENTER FOR VOTING AND DEMOCRACY, AS 
EASY AS 1-2-3:  FINAL REPORT OF THE VERMONT COMMISSION TO STUDY INSTANT RUNOFF 
VOTING, at http://www.fairvotevermont.org/1 
23/c_history.htm (last visited June 22, 2005) (on file with the American University Law 
Review) (reporting that Vermont began offering official, government-printed ballots that 
listed all the official candidates in 1892).  “The Australian innovation [i.e., official ballot] 
adopted by Vermont was the use of government-printed ballots that listed all qualifying 
candidates.”  Id.  Because of rampant illiteracy, southern states tended to lag behind in this 
reform effort.  See FREDMAN, supra note 23, at 97 (stating that ten states, “seven of which 
belonged to the confederacy—Louisiana, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, North 
Carolina, Virginia and Florida,” had not adopted the voting reforms by 1892).  
 36. See MICHAEL J. DUBIN, UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS, 1788-1997:  
THE OFFICIAL RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS OF THE 1ST THROUGH THE 105TH CONGRESSES xxiv 
(McFarland & Co., Inc. 1998) (stating that the “publicly printed ballot was adopted in some 
form by all but three states between 1888 and 1916”). 
 37. People ex rel. Breckton v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of Chi., 77 N.E. 321, 323 (Ill. 
BROWN OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  2:42:19 PM 
2005] BALLOT FEES 1289 
The question that emerged was how to limit the number of candidates 
whose names would be pre-printed on the new Australian ballots.  Most 
states solved this problem by simply turning it over to the parties.  In 
Illinois, for example, nomination was by party caucus.38  Some states, like 
Louisiana, added a newly developed alternative that allowed candidates to 
gain access by gathering voters’ signatures.39  Although this alternative 
allowed fledgling candidates to circumvent party caucuses and 
conventions, it proved largely useless in practice.  Contrary to the 
Australian (two signatures) and English (ten signatures) models on which it 
was based,40 most states set the “number of names required on the 
petition . . . impossibly high so that the candidates would be restricted in 
practice to the nominees of the two major parties.”41   Even Massachusetts, 
which was regarded as a model by reformers across the United States, 
“required one thousand signatures for a state-wide office, and at least fifty 
for a district office.”42  The Democratic and Republican parties thus tended 
to control the makeup of official, pre-printed ballots, just as they had 
effectively controlled the old system by printing ballots themselves.  
Indeed, candidates wishing a party’s endorsement were “often required to 
pay the party excessive sums to insure that their names would be placed on 
the ballot . . . .”43  For their parts, states consequently exercised little 
control over whose names were placed on ballots. 
2.   Qualifications 
The absence of official paper ballots does not imply a lack of 
qualifications.  Quite to the contrary, the colonies and newly created states 
frequently imposed qualifications on candidates for office, as well as their 
electors.  Property qualifications, for example, were common in the 
                                                                                                                                      
1906).  See State ex rel. Labauve v. Michel, 46 So. 430, 431 (La. 1908) (observing that to 
properly adopt the Australian ballot system in which “the state prints and distributes the 
ballots . . . it is indispensable that by some means the names to be put on the ballot should 
be designated to the officer, or, in other words, that the candidates shall have been 
nominated”). 
 38. See Sanner v. Patton, 40 N.E. 290, 292-93 (Ill. 1895) (explaining that section 14 of 
the voting act prohibits voters from writing down the names of people who have not been 
nominated and that the ballot only contains names of persons whom a political party has 
nominated). 
 39. See Labauve, 46 So. at 432 (noting that Act No. 152 of the voting act of 1898 
provided for three ways to be nominated:  (a) by convention, (b) “by caucus or other 
nominating body,” and (c) by nominating paper); see also FREDMAN, supra note 23, at 73 
(observing that in the South, going to the Australian ballot stemmed from “mingled motives 
of discrimination and reform,” which was thought to disenfranchise illiterates, who were 
primarily African Americans at the time). 
 40. FREDMAN, supra note 23, at 73. 
 41. Id. at 47-48 (calculating the required signatures for state office in Pennsylvania, for 
example, at one-half of one percent of the “last total vote cast”). 
 42. FREDMAN, supra note 23, at 47. 
 43. Id. at ix. 
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colonies and were eagerly embraced following the American Revolution.44  
While these restrictions did not always demand outright ownership on the 
part of electors,45 they often did.46  Poll taxes placed on electors, though 
uncommon, were not unheard of either.47  Women, slaves, and indentured 
servants, moreover, were denied suffrage.48  Race restrictions on electors 
                                                          
 44. This is not to say that the colonies always imposed property restrictions.  Virginia’s 
experience, for example, was varied.  BISHOP, supra note 15, at 70-71.  Its constitution and 
ordinance of 1621 provided that “all inhabitants of the colony were to have a vote in the 
choice of burgesses.”  Id. at 70.  This was the rule for close to thirty years, 
until in 1655 a law was passed limiting the franchise to “all housekeepers, whether 
ffreeholders [sic], leaseholders or otherwise tenants”.  But in less than a year this 
statute was repealed, because, said the house of burgesses, “we conceive it 
something hard and unagreeable to reason that any person shall pay equall [sic] 
taxes and yet have no votes in elections”.  It was not long, however, before the 
harshness of this rule was lost sight of, and the house of burgesses in 1670 . . . 
[limited the franchise to] only “ffreeholders [sic] and house keepers who are 
answerable to the publique [sic] for the levies . . . .” 
Id. at 70-71. 
 45. Colonial New Jersey, for example, limited its vote to “inhabitants,” which included 
“Freeholder[s], [] Tenant[s] for Years, or Householder[s] & Resident[s] . . . .”  ALBERT 
MCKINLEY, THE SUFFRAGE FRANCHISE IN THE THIRTEEN ENGLISH COLONIES IN AMERICA 257 
(Ginn & Co. 1905)(quoting Act of 1766).  As a result, non-freeholders were apparently able 
to vote in at least some local elections during the colonial period.  Id.  “The usual statement, 
therefore, that the suffrage in New Jersey was limited to freeholders must be qualified in 
large measure by the admission of householders in certain towns for the provincial suffrage, 
and householders throughout the whole colony in local elections.”  Id.  Similarly, “[t]he 
suffrage [in Delaware] was extended to all freeholders and to those housekeepers who had 
resided one year in the borough and hired a house and ground of the yearly value of at least 
five pounds.”  Id. at 272. 
 46. See Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 
STAN. L. REV. 335, 337 (1989): 
By the middle of the eighteenth century, all the American colonies save one had 
adopted property qualifications for the suffrage.  Colonists explained the 
disenfranchisement of the propertyless in their midst in part by observing that such 
people “had no wills of their own.”  Under colonial restrictions all the propertyless, 
regardless of whether they were wage earners or recipients of poor relief, occupied 
the same political status.  After the Revolution, . . . many states began to 
enfranchise some of those who owned no property, mainly wage earners and 
leaseholders . . . . 
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 24 (The Free Press 1986) (1913) (stating that 
although the extent of disenfranchisement cannot be determined, property qualifications that 
existed in some states excluded many adult males from voting in elections). 
 47. See G. Edward White, The Anti-Judge:  William O. Douglas and the Ambiguities of 
Individuality, 74 VA. L. REV. 17, 74 (1988) (observing that although they were not regularly 
employed, the framers of the Constitution permitted and made no effort to invalidate poll 
taxes on equal protection grounds); 1 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, A CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 1776-1850, 96 (1898) (noting that South Carolina used a 
poll tax as a substitute for property qualifications); John Victor Berry, Comment, Take the 
Money and Run:  Lame-Ducks “Quack” and Pass Voter Identification Provisions, 74 U. 
DET. MERCY L. REV. 291, 304-05 & n.78 (1997) (observing that the use of poll taxes during 
revolutionary period was intended to expand the suffrage to men who did not meet the 
property qualifications). 
 48. See BEARD, supra note 46, at 24 (stating that four groups were disenfranchised due 
to economic status as a non-freeholder in American society in 1787:  (a) slaves, (b) 
indentured servants, (c) men who did not fulfill the property qualifications found in state 
constitutions and laws, and (d)  women). 
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were prevalent in the south.49 
Colonial and Revolution-era representatives were subjected to these 
same requirements, and more.50  In addition to age51 and residence52 
requirements, property qualifications53 and religious tests54 were common.  
Unlike suffrage restrictions,55 the property requirements imposed on 
representatives frequently required outright ownership, as opposed to 
leaseholds and simply keeping “house.”  For example, while non-
freeholders in New Jersey were sometimes allowed to vote, elected 
representatives were required to possess a “£500 real and personal estate in 
that county.”56  Indeed, most states required that their local senators possess 
                                                          
 49. See BISHOP, supra note 15, at 53 (noting that in southern colonies, statutes required 
race qualifications for voting and in northern colonies, no “law that would prevent an Indian 
or a negro, if otherwise qualified, from voting in the northern colonies” appeared to exist). 
 50. See THORPE, supra note 47, at 93 (stating that property qualifications for electors 
“were less exacting than those for office-holders” because “[a] shorter residence and less 
property were required”). 
 51. See id. at 68-71 (documenting age requirements for members of state houses found 
in state constitutions from 1776 through 1799).  Of the fifteen American states that existed 
at the turn of the eighteenth century, all except Kentucky required that representatives be 
twenty-one.  Id. at 71.  Kentucky required that its local House members be twenty-four.  Id. 
 52. Id. at 68-71 (documenting residence requirements for members of state houses 
found in state constitutions from 1776 through 1799).  A requirement that a male reside in 
the state for one year was the most common, though states also frequently employed two 
and three-year requirements.  Id. 
 53. Property qualifications for elected representatives to states’ lower houses between 
1776 and 1799 provide useful examples.  New Hampshire in 1784 required that 
representatives possess an estate worth one hundred pounds, one half of which had to be a 
freehold.  Id. at 68.  See also BEARD, supra note 46, at 65 (noting that every member of the 
new Hampshire’s lower house was required to own “an estate ‘of the value of one hundred 
pounds, one half of which to be a freehold’”).  Massachusetts required of each lower house 
representative in 1780 a “[f]reehold of £100 in [the] town he represents, or [a] ratable estate 
of £200 in that town.”  THORPE, supra note 47, at 69.  New Jersey required in 1776 a “£500 
real and personal estate in that county.”  Id.  Delaware and Virginia demanded simple 
“freeholds” in 1776.  Id. at 70.  Maryland in 1776 required “£500 real and personal 
property.”  Id.  North Carolina in 1776 required “100 acres for life in fee (possessor thereof 
for 6 mos. before election) in the county represented.”  Id.  South Carolina in 1778 required 
“£3500 (currency) in real estate.”  Id.  Georgia in 1777 required “250 acres of land or £250.”  
Id. at 71.  Tennessee in 1796 required “200 acres, freehold.”  Id.  Only Vermont, New York 
and Kentucky failed to impose property restrictions on representatives.  Id. at 69-71.  But 
see BEARD, supra note 46, at 67 (noting that New York in 1777 required that its state 
senators be freeholders of an estate worth one hundred pounds and its electors hold freehold 
estates).  Pennsylvania only required that its representatives be taxpayers.  THORPE, supra 
note 47, at 69.  Because Connecticut and Rhode Island continued to operate under their old 
royal charters following the Revolution and did not adopt new constitutions, their electors  
were required, per their old charters, to hold real or personal property of a certain value.  
BEARD, supra note 46, at 66. 
 54. BEARD, supra note 46, at 68-71 (documenting religious requirements for members 
of state houses from 1776 through 1799). 
 55. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text. 
 56. THORPE, supra note 47, at 69.  See also BEARD, supra note 46, at 65 (observing that 
while representatives in New Hampshire were required to own property, “[t]he suffrage was 
widely extended, for freeholders, tax payers, and even those who paid a poll tax could 
vote”).  By way of contrast, New York’s representatives in 1777 were not subjected to a 
property restriction, see THORPE, supra note 47, at 69, though its electors commonly were.  
See BEARD, supra note 46, at 67 (observing that New York’s senators, their electors, and 
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more property than members of their local houses of representatives.57 
Ratified in 1781, the Articles of Confederation left to state legislatures 
the power to select delegates to Congress.58  Similarly, delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787 were selected by state legislatures.59  
Consequently, the qualifications and interests of federal delegates and state 
representatives during this early American period tended to coalesce.60  
One might say that the elected federal officials of this era were subject to 
de facto property requirements.61  However, following ratification of the 
Constitution, only one of the original thirteen colonies, Virginia, demanded 
that its federal representatives own property.62 
Between the Constitutional Convention and the American Civil War, 
most states replaced their property qualifications for voters and 
representatives with taxpayer requirements and pauper exclusions.63  These 
                                                                                                                                      
“voter[s] for members of the lower house” were required to be freeholders). 
 57. See THORPE, supra note 47, at 77-79 (documenting property qualifications for state 
senators found in state constitutions between 1776 and 1800).  New Hampshire in 1784, for 
example, required that its state senators possess a “[f]reehold worth £200.”  Id. at 77; see 
also BEARD, supra note 46, at 65 (observing that New Hampshire’s constitution of 1784 
“provided that ‘no person shall be capable of being elected a senator who is not of the 
Protestant religion, and seized of a freehold estate in his own right of the value of two 
hundred pounds’”).  Massachusetts in 1780 required “£300 in freehold, or £600 in personal 
estate.”  THORPE, supra note 47, at 78.  New York in 1777 required that its state senators be 
“[f]reeholder[s].”  Id.  New Jersey in 1776 required that its senators possess “£1000 
proclamation money, if real and personal estate.”  Id.  Delaware and Virginia required that 
their senators be “[f]reeholder[s].”  Id.  Maryland in 1776 required “£1000 real and personal 
[property].”  Id.  North Carolina in 1776 required that its senators possess “300 acres in 
fee.”  Id.  South Carolina required that its senators in 1778 possess £2000 settled freehold 
estate.”  Id.  Neither Pennsylvania nor Georgia had upper houses.  Id. at 78-79; BEARD, 
supra note 46, at 64.  Only Vermont and Kentucky eschewed property restrictions between 
1776 and 1799.  THORPE, supra note 47, at 77-79.   Some states, like New York, also 
required that state senators’ electors possess more property than house members’ electors.  
See BEARD, supra note 46, at 67 (noting that in New York senate electors had to possess 
freeholds worth £100 while house electors only had to possess freeholds worth £20 “or have 
rented a tenement therein of the yearly value of forty shillings, and been rated and actually 
paid taxes to this state”).  
 58. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. V (1781); see also U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 
514 U.S. 779, 851 n.3 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that the states could require 
their delegates to submit qualifications “above and beyond the qualifications created by the 
Articles of Confederation”). 
 59. BEARD, supra note 46, at 64 (“The resolution of the Congress under the Articles of 
Confederation calling for the Convention provided that the delegates should be ‘appointed 
by the states’.  The actual selection was made in each case by the legislature, both houses 
participating, except in Georgia and Pennsylvania, which had unicameral assemblies.’”). 
 60. See id. at 65 (“A further safeguard against the injection of too much popular feeling 
into the choice of delegates to the Convention was afforded by the property qualifications 
generally placed on voters and members of the legislatures by the state constitutions and 
laws in force in 1787.”). 
 61. Electors of delegates to the various state ratifying conventions were also generally 
restricted by property qualifications.  Id. at 240.  As a result, the elected delegates, while not 
technically required to own property, were subject to a de facto property qualification.  Id. 
 62. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 823-24 (citing 1788 Va. Acts, ch. 23, § 2) (footnote omitted). 
 63. See STEINFELD, supra note 46, at 353 (reporting that “[o]utside of the new Western 
states, very few departed from these norms by establishing white manhood suffrage without 
pauper exclusion”). 
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exclusive devices continued through and beyond the Civil War.64  In the 
aftermath of the Civil War, of course, race-based denials of the franchise 
and right to run for office were outlawed by the federal Civil War 
Amendments.65  Barred from disenfranchising their newly freed slaves, 
most southern states turned to “poll taxes.”66  Although these fees, and their 
close property-qualification cousins, were whittled away in the early part of 
the twentieth century,67 poll taxes and pauper exclusions were not finally 
laid to rest until 1969.68  Property requirements for elected officials, though 
of dubious constitutionality, persist to this day.69 
                                                          
 64. See id. at 335 (stating that “[b]y the end of the nineteenth century, fourteen states 
had excluded either ‘paupers’ generally or inmates of poorhouses from the suffrage [and 
that] [a]s late as 1934, all of these states continued to do so”). 
 65. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (prohibiting states from denying or abridging the 
right to vote “on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude”); id. amend. 
XIV, § 1 (guaranteeing equal protection).   But see Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 53-
56 (1974) (upholding disenfranchisement of convicted felons based on the framers’ intent in 
drafting section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 66. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA:  ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 1875 (Johnny H. Killian et al. eds., 1987) 
[hereinafter CRS ANALYSIS] (stating that at the end of Reconstruction eleven states in the 
south instituted the poll tax as a qualification for voting and only five states continued to use 
a poll tax when the Twenty-fourth Amendment passed). 
 67. See, e.g., Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 281 (1937) (sustaining Georgia’s one 
dollar poll tax while noting that “the Constitutions of some states prohibit or limit poll 
taxes”); Johnson v. Grand Forks County, 113 N.W. 1071, 1072 (N.D. 1907) (observing that 
the state constitution prohibited property qualifications and poll taxes for voters:  “The 
Legislature cannot prescribe a property qualification as a prerequisite to being allowed to 
vote [and] . . . cannot require a voter to pay a sum of money to any officer or to any 
department of government before he can vote”). 
 68. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969) (striking down 
school board suffrage requirement that voters either have children enrolled in schools or 
own or lease taxable real property); Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969) 
(nullifying the Louisiana requirement that voters in election to approve revenue bond be 
property taxpayers); see also Phoenix v. Kolodzieiski, 399 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1970) 
(invalidating the property taxpayer requirement for general bond election).  The Twenty-
fourth Amendment, passed in 1964, outlawed poll taxes in federal elections.  U.S. CONST. 
amend. XXIV.  The Supreme Court in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, struck 
down poll taxes in state elections as violating the Equal Protection Clause.  383 U.S. 663, 
667-69 (1966).  But even after Kramer and Harper, property qualifications could still be 
valid in the context of special-use elections, like “water storage district” elections.  See 
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 727-31 (1973) 
(upholding California law allowing only landowners to vote in “water storage district” 
elections); Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 371 (1981) (sustaining “one-acre-one-vote” scheme 
for electing directors of Arizona water district). 
 69. The Supreme Court in Turner v. Fouche, applied a rational basis test to invalidate a 
Georgia freeholder requirement for school board members under the Equal Protection 
Clause but cautioned that it was not “excluding the possibility that other circumstances 
might present themselves in which a qualification for office-holding could survive 
constitutional scrutiny . . . .”  396 U.S. 346, 364 (1970).  In Chappelle v. Greater Baton 
Rouge Airport District, the Court struck down, under the authority of Turner, a Louisiana 
property requirement for airport commissioners.  431 U.S. 159 (1977) (per curiam).  Most 
recently, in Quinn v. Millsap, the Court invalidated a Missouri law that required certain 
appointed officials to own real estate, declaring:  “we cannot agree . . . that under the Equal 
Protection Clause . . . land-owners alone may be eligible for appointment to a body 
empowered to propose a wholesale revision of local government.”  491 U.S. 95, 109 (1989).  
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3.  Nominating procedures 
The prevalence of voice voting and informal paper ballots at the time of 
the Constitutional Convention did not mean that nominating procedures 
were nonexistent.  Quite often, informal procedures were followed to 
propose candidates for office.  Groups would “caucus” to nominate 
friends70 or place advertisements in local newspapers to announce 
candidacies.71  Regardless of the exact method, “a more or less thorough 
system of nominating candidates for offices of a general character 
prevailed” in some of the colonies before independence.72 
Both before and after the Revolution, several colonies employed a 
“process of exclusion” to narrow electoral choices.73  Candidates were 
“nominated” by voters in a preliminary stage of the election, and only those 
who received the most nominating votes proved eligible in a later, general 
election.74  The Framers’ creation of the Electoral College for presidential 
elections is a testament to this approach.75  As originally envisioned, the 
states, through their appointed electors, were to nominate no more than five 
presidential candidates.76  Assuming that none of these five received a 
majority of all votes cast—a safe assumption “in a vast nation with a 
primitive communications infrastructure”77—this list was then to be 
referred to the House for ultimate presidential selection.78 
Connecticut employed this two-stage model before the Revolution and 
                                                                                                                                      
These three cases are discussed more fully, infra notes 213-225 and accompanying text. 
 70. See ROBERT J. DINKIN, VOTING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA:  A STUDY OF 
ELECTIONS IN THE ORIGINAL THIRTEEN STATES, 1776-1789, 57 (1982) (noting that the basic 
means for nomination was self-announcement accomplished by friends and relatives who 
would spread the word). 
 71. See id. at 58 (reporting that in towns that published newspapers, those who wished 
to run for office would often alert the press and possibly take out an ad to declare their 
candidacy).  Commonly, those who sought administrative posts, “such as sherriff and 
coroner,” used this approach.  Id.  Occasionally, those seeking legislative positions also used 
it.  Id. 
 72. BISHOP, supra note 15, at 120. “There was nothing resembling the modern method 
of nomination by opposing parties, but the plan followed seems to have been practically a 
preliminary election for the purpose of reducing the whole number of eligible candidates by 
a process of exclusion.”  Id. at 120-21. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Note, Rethinking the Electoral College Debate:  The Framers, Federalism, and One 
Person, One Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2526, 2528 (2001).  In presidential elections, there 
was a “‘nomination’ stage, in which an electoral college of elders would express a filtered 
version of the popular will, and a ‘selection’ stage, in which the House of Representatives 
would ultimately choose the winner from among the top several candidates.”  Id. 
 75. See generally id. at 2527-31 (noting that opposition to a popular vote “centered not 
on a distrust of the unpredictable whims of an unbridled electorate, but rather on the 
practical ability of voters to make informed choices about national candidates in a vast 
nation with a primitive communications infrastructure”) (footnotes omitted). 
    76.    See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. 
 77. See Note, Rethinking the Electoral College Debate, 114 HARV. L. REV. at 2528.  
 78. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. 
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for thirty years following the ratification of the Constitution.79  New 
Jersey’s approach during the first congressional election was similar.  It 
divided the contest into two stages:  the first allowed any qualified voter to 
“nominate four candidates by delivering a list of names to the clerk of the 
court of common pleas in each county who would in turn transmit them to 
the governor for publication.”80  The general electorate then chose four at-
large representatives from those so nominated, fifty-four in all, during the 
second stage.81 
Given their inability to manage ballots and their apparent unwillingness 
to restrict popular choices, the newly-created states frequently tallied votes 
for numerous candidates.82  Even states that used “processes of exclusion” 
(like Connecticut and New Jersey) saw lots of candidates receive votes in 
their final elections.83  New Jersey listed votes for fifty-four candidates, at-
large, for four federal House seats in 1789.84  Connecticut’s first 
congressional election saw twelve candidates receive votes, at-large, for 
five House seats.85  Because true parties would not emerge for another forty 
years,86 candidacies at the time of the founding were not limited by the 
forces of politics.  While not a free-for-all, the electoral apparatus known to 
the Framers was freer than the process that exists today. 
B. Post-Bellum Changes in the Electoral Process 
By the time of the Civil War, America had planted the seeds of the 
                                                          
 79. See DUBIN, supra note 36, at xiv (stating that “Connecticut originally [1788-1818] 
had a two-part election process unique among the states:  [t]he first segment which took 
place in April, was known as nominations,” where the voter chose “a given number of 
candidates from among all those running.”  “For example, in the state’s first Congressional 
election, the voter nominated 12 individuals in April who then ran for the state’s five 
Congressional seats in September.  In September, voters chose five individuals from among 
those whom the voters nominated back in April.”).  
 80. Richard P. McCormick, New Jersey’s First Congressional Election, 1789:  A Case 
Study in Political Skullduggery, 6 WM. & MARY Q. 237, 238 (Apr. 1949). 
 81. Id. at 239-40 (noting that campaigns over the four congressional seats began “even 
before the legislature adjourned”). 
 82. See DUBIN, supra note 36, at 1-2 (illustrating that five candidates in Delaware, 
vying for one seat, received votes).  In Georgia, which used at-large voting for 
representatives from three districts, eleven candidates were reported to have garnered votes.  
Id.  Maryland, which used a combination at-large/district voting system, elected six 
representatives from twelve candidates.  Id.  New Hampshire counted votes for over ten 
candidates, at-large, for three House seats.  Id.  In Massachusetts, which relied on districts to 
elect its eight representatives, over forty candidates received votes.  Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. McCormick, supra note 80, at 240.  Political rulers in West Jersey and some from 
East Jersey combined to assemble what was known as the “Junto ticket” which was made up 
of two candidates from West Jersey and two candidates from East Jersey.  Id. at 239.  In 
East Jersey, the well known leaders were unable to agree on a slate of candidates whom they 
could back to oppose the “Junto ticket.”  Id. at 240 (footnotes omitted).  Although fifty-four 
men were nominated, many later withdrew from the race.  Id. 
 85. DUBIN, supra note 36, at 1-2. 
 86. See ALDRICH, supra note 25, at 97 (tracing the birth of party politics to 1828). 
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current two-party system.  The Republican Party had emerged from the 
collapse of the Whigs to challenge the existing Democratic Party.87  After 
the war, these two parties continued to control most of America’s politics 
and elections.88  It was this control that led the Progressive Movement to 
demand popular primaries in the early years of the twentieth century.  
Although local parties in some states voluntarily embraced primaries,89 the 
two major parties generally preferred caucuses and conventions.  Primaries, 
after all, threatened to wrest control of nominations from party bosses and 
“machines”90 and place them in the hands of the masses. 
The first direct primary law was passed by the Wisconsin legislature in 
1903.91  By the time the Seventeenth Amendment (which required direct 
                                                          
 87. See generally id. at 144-56. 
 88. See id. at 159 (stating that the by the 1860s the Democratic and Republican parties’ 
“basic coalitional division of North versus South” was visible and despite the fact that the 
division varied over time, it was not until the “contemporary era” that it ended). 
 89. See, e.g., State v. Hirsch, 24 N.E. 1062 (Ind. 1890) (describing a political party’s 
primary election in the context of criminal prohibition on selling alcohol on election day). 
 90. See FREDERICK A. CLEVELAND, THE GROWTH OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 
408 (1898) (arguing for limited use of primaries to offset power of party “machines”).  
Primaries were put in place to correct the deficiencies of the caucus/convention system.  
Johnson v. Grand Forks County, 113 N.W. 1071, 1072 (N.D. 1907).  “The methods pursued 
in such caucuses and conventions, it was believed, had become unrepresentative and unfair, 
if not corrupt, and the people demanded the enactment of a law under which direct 
nominations could be made, hoping thereby to eliminate many of the abuses which were 
thought to have become a part of the old system.”  Id. 
 91. FREDMAN, supra note 23, at 93.  Oregon implemented primaries in 1904.  See 
Patton v. Withycombe, 159 P. 78, 79 (Or. 1916) (citing Direct Primary Nominating 
Elections Law, ch. 1, 1905 Or. Laws 7).  Nebraska adopted primaries in 1905.  See State ex 
rel. Adair v. Drexel, 105 N.W. 174, 175 (Neb. 1905) (referencing Act of Mar. 30, 1905, ch. 
66, 1905 Neb. Laws 325).  Missouri first mandated primaries in 1913.  See State ex rel. 
Haller v. Arnold, 210 S.W. 374, 375 (Mo. 1919) (citing Act of Feb. 24, 1913, § 6014, 1913 
Mo. Laws 335, 337).  California first used primaries in 1901.  See Socialist Party v. Uhl, 
103 P. 181, 183 (Cal. 1909) (observing that California’s constitution was amended in 1890 
to empower the legislature to require primaries).  Maryland began using primaries in 1904.  
See Kenneweg v. Allegany County Comm’rs, 62 A. 249, 250 (Md. 1905) (citing Act of Apr. 
8, 1904, ch. 508, 1904 Md. Laws 870).  Illinois added primaries in 1905.  See People ex rel. 
Breckton v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of Chi., 77 N.E. 321, 322 (Ill. 1906), overruled by 
People ex rel. Lindstrand v. Emmerson, 16 N.E.2d 370 (Ill. 1929) (citing Act of May 18, 
1905, § 1, 1905 Ill. Laws 211, 213).  Indiana’s primary system was put in place in 1915.  
See Kelso v. Cook, 110 N.E. 987, 989 (Ind. 1916) (citing Act of Mar. 8, 1915, ch. 105, 1915 
Ind. Acts 359).  Tennessee added primaries with its “Primary Election Law” in 1909.  See 
Ledgerwood v. Pitts, 125 S.W. 1036 (Tenn. 1910) (citing Act of Feb. 19, 1909, ch. 102, 
1909 Tenn. Pub. Acts 281).  North Dakota enacted its first primary law in 1905.  See 
Johnson v. Grand Forks County, 113 N.W. 1071, 1072 (N.D. 1907) (citing Act of Feb. 21, 
1905, ch. 109, 1905 N.D. Laws 207).  Washington began using primaries in 1907.  See 
Boomer v. Nichols, 97 P. 733, 734 (Wash. 1908) (citing Act of Mar. 15, 1907, ch. 209, 1907 
Wash. Laws 457).  Nevada adopted direct primaries in 1909.  See Riter v. Douglass, 109 P. 
444, 445 (Nev. 1910) (citing Act of Mar. 23, 1909, ch. 198, 1909 Nev. Stat. 273).  
Minnesota enacted its first primary law in 1899.  See Fitz v. Jensen, 89 N.W. 1126, 1127 
(Minn. 1902) (citing Act of Apr. 20, 1899, ch. 349, 1899 Minn. Laws 447).  All of these 
laws survived constitutional attack.  In the context of presidential elections, only six states, 
California, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, Wisconsin, and New Jersey, mandated 
primaries before the election of 1912.  See JAMES CHASE, 1912:  WILSON, ROOSEVELT, TAFT 
& DEBS—THE ELECTION THAT CHANGED THE COUNTRY 110 (2004) (describing the 
mechanics of the presidential election of 1912).  For the 1912 presidential election, six more 
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election of U.S. Senators) was ratified in 1913, the courtship of political 
primaries and Australian ballots was almost complete.92  By 1917, all states 
used Australian ballots93 and only four had failed to require primaries.94 
States imported to their primaries the two devices they had used to limit 
the Australian election ballot in the first instance:  filing fees and signature 
collections.  When Oregon adopted primaries in 1904, for example, it 
required that candidates collect signatures to garner space on its official, 
pre-printed primary ballots.95  By 1915, Oregon added filing fees as 
alternative access mechanisms.96  Missouri, which first mandated primaries 
in 1913,97 authorized candidates to either collect signatures or pay filing 
fees in order to have their names placed on official ballots.98 
Some states, like Texas, required that the major parties administer and 
fund their own primaries.99  Naturally, the parties passed these costs on to 
candidates by way of filing fees.100  Where this happened, fees tended to be 
quite large; parties, moreover, rarely allowed non-monetary alternatives or 
exceptions.101 
Filing fees became common even in those states that provided public 
funding for party primaries.  Nevada, for example, initially required that 
candidates both pay a fee and collect signatures from three percent of the 
                                                                                                                                      
states, Illinois, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Ohio and South Dakota, had added 
presidential primaries.  Id. 
 92. State courts routinely rejected the argument that primaries differed from general 
elections and thus should be subjected to different rules.  See, e.g., Johnson, 113 N.W. at 
1073 (holding that the same restrictions on voting rights and ballot access apply to primaries 
as well general elections). 
 93. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text (describing the development of the 
Australian ballot in the United States). 
 94. FREDMAN, supra note 23, at 93. 
 95. See Patton, 159 P. at 79 (citing Direct Primary Nominating Elections Law, ch. 1, 
1905 Or. Laws 7). 
 96. Id. 
 97. See generally Haller v. Arnold, 210 S.W. 374 (Mo. 1919). 
 98. Id. at 375. 
 99. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 137-38 (1972) (describing Texas’s primary 
system and the manner in which Texas funded the system). 
 100. In Texas, the Terrell Election Law mandated primaries for all state, district, and 
county offices.  O. Douglas Weeks, The Handbook of Texas Online, at 
http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/EE/wde1.html (last modified 
May 13, 2005) (on file with the American University Law Review).  Prior to the advent of 
primaries, party conventions selected candidates.  Id.  Because primaries were required to be 
administered and funded by the parties, “most of the money came from filing fees.”  Id.; see 
also Ledgerwood v. Pitts, 125 S.W. 1036, 1045 (Tenn. 1910) (describing the Tennessee 
primary law that required parties to hold and fund primaries while capping the fees 
charged). 
 101. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 138-39.  The Court in Bullock stated that, 
[t]he record shows that the fees required of the candidates in this case are far from 
exceptional in their magnitude.  The size of the filing fees is plainly a natural 
consequence of a statutory system that places the burden of financing primary 
elections on candidates rather than on the governmental unit, and that imposes a 
particularly heavy burden on candidates for local office. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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eligible, registered voters.102  By 1914, however, the state had abandoned 
signature collection and relied solely on fees.103  Minnesota,104 North 
Dakota,105 Tennessee,106 South Dakota,107 Indiana,108 and Nebraska109 
(among others110) all opted for filing fees by 1916.111 
The fees charged by most states, though not nominal, were 
constitutionally reasonable when judged by today’s ballot fee standards.112  
States today commonly charge candidates up to one percent of an office’s 
annual salary113 (which for congressional candidates translates into just 
                                                          
 102. See Riter v. Douglass, 109 P. 444, 456 (Nev. 1910) (sustaining the use of filing 
fees). 
The right of the Legislature to exact a reasonable fee from candidates for office has 
been sustained in practically every state where a primary law exists upon the same 
principle that fees in actions at law and proceeding in courts and for the filing and 
recording of documents are sustained. 
Id.  The Court further noted that because elected politicians benefited from becoming 
elected, they should feel “compelled to reimburse the state for at least some of the portion of 
the expense which the state incurs in maintaining the means whereby they accomplish their 
desires.”  Id. 
 103. See State ex rel. Riggle v. Brodigan, 143 P. 238, 239 (Nev. 1914) (highlighting the 
controversy behind signature requirements that led the legislature to change the primary 
election law to only require ballot fees because candidates felt the signature collection 
process was harsh). 
 104. See State ex rel. Thompson v. Scott, 108 N.W. 828, 830 (Minn. 1906) (sustaining 
filing fees as reasonable and constitutional). 
 105. See Johnson v. Grand Forks County, 113 N.W. 1071, 1076 (N.D. 1907) (striking 
down filing fee as arbitrary and not useful for the stated purposes). 
 106. See Ledgerwood v. Pitts, 125 S.W. 1036, 1045 (Tenn. 1910) (holding filing fee 
requirements unconstitutional). 
 107. See Ballinger v. McLaughlin, 116 N.W. 70, 71 (S.D. 1908) (invalidating a filing fee 
requirement as an unconstitutional exaction). 
 108. See Kelso v. Cook, 110 N.E. 987, 996 (Ind. 1916) (finding filing fee requirements 
arbitrary and unfair to minority party candidates). 
 109. See State ex rel. Adair v. Drexel, 105 N.W. 174, 180 (Neb. 1905) (declaring a filing 
fee requirement an “unwarranted hindrance and impediment to the free exercise of the 
elective franchise”). 
 110. See generally J.A. Connelly, Validity and Effect of Statutes Exacting Filing Fees 
From Candidates for Public Office, 89 A.L.R.2d 864 (1963) (cataloging states that enacted 
filing fee requirements for primaries). 
 111. Some states, like New Hampshire, see Public Laws of the State of New Hampshire, 
ch. 25, § 13 (Clarke Press 1925) (charging $100 fee for Senatorial candidates and $50 fee 
for House candidates), allowed signature collection as alternatives.  Id. § 14.  New 
Hampshire allowed the parties, by convention, to nominate their candidates when no one 
entered their primaries.  See Act Relating to Primary Elections, Nominations of Candidates 
and Political Expenditures, ch. 137, § 2, 1927 N.H. Laws.  Even in this situation, however, 
the parties were required to pay the filing fee.  Id. (“The party committee shall pay the usual 
filing fee or file the usual number of petitions with the nominations.”). 
 112. See Mark R. Brown, Popularizing Ballot Access:  The Front Door to Election 
Reform, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1281 (1997) (describing filing fees in place at the time of the 1996 
elections and concluding that by comparative standards fees equal to one percent of the 
congressional salary are constitutionally reasonable). 
 113. Id. at 1310-12 (reporting that of the twenty-seven states charging filing fees for 
congressional elections in 1996, all but five charged one percent of the congressional salary 
or less).  Because Delaware was incorrectly cataloged in that study as charging only one 
percent of the annual congressional salary, as opposed to the salary for the full two-year 
term, see Biener v. Calio, 361 F.3d 206, 209 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, Biener v. Calio, 
125 S. Ct. 55 (2004) (upholding Delaware law authorizing parties to charge fee equal to one 
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over $1,600).114  Assuming that one percent of an office’s salary is 
constitutionally agreeable, most primary fees in the early 1900s seemed 
reasonable.  Indiana115 and Washington,116 for example, both required that 
candidates pay one percent of their expected annual salaries in order to run 
in newly mandated primaries.  South Dakota in 1908 charged five dollars 
for the privilege of running for the state legislature.117  Minnesota charged 
twenty dollars in 1906 to run for any salaried office.118  Nevada’s fee in 
1914 for statewide office was $100.119  Tennessee in 1910 authorized 
political parties to charge up to fifty dollars for those seeking election to the 
federal House of Representatives.120  California in 1907 charged twenty-
five dollars to run for the House of Representatives and fifty dollars to run 
for the Senate.121  North Carolina in 1915 charged fifty dollars for both 
Houses of Congress.122  Illinois’s $100 fee for congressional candidates 
(both the Senate and House) in 1906123 was not much more than one 
percent of the congressional salary ($7,500),124 nor was the $100 fee 
                                                                                                                                      
percent of salary for entire term), six states of the aforementioned twenty-seven states in 
1996 charged more than one percent of the annual congressional salary.  Still, a majority of 
states using filing fees charged one percent or less of the congressional salary. 
 114. See PAUL E. DWYER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS REPORT FOR 
CONGRESS, SALARIES OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS:  A LIST OF PAYABLE RATES AND EFFECTIVE 
DATES, 1789-2004, tbl. 1 (2005) (listing congressional salaries as of Jan. 1, 2005 at 
$162,100), available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/97-1011.pdf. 
 115. See Kelso v. Cook, 110 N.E. 987, 996 (Ind. 1916) (striking down filing fee 
requirements as arbitrary and unfair to minority party candidates). 
 116. See State ex rel. Boomer v. Nichols, 97 P. 733, 734 (Wash. 1908) (sustaining a 
filing fee as a reasonable requirement). 
 117. See Ballinger v. McLaughlin, 116 N.W. 70, 71 (S.D. 1908) (invalidating a filing fee 
requirement as an unconstitutional exaction). 
 118. See State ex rel. Thompson v. Scott, 108 N.W. 828, 829 (Minn. 1906) (sustaining 
filing fees as reasonable and constitutional). 
 119. See State ex rel. Riggle v. Brodigan, 143 P. 238, 239-40 (Nev. 1914) (finding that a 
filing fee was a reasonable legislative regulation). 
 120. See Ledgerwood v. Pitts, 125 S.W. 1036, 1045 (Tenn. 1910) (striking down fee 
requirements as unconstitutional). 
 121. See 1907 Cal. Stat. § 7.1. (“A filing fee of fifty dollars shall be paid to the secretary 
of state when the nomination paper or papers and affidavit for any candidate for state office 
or the United States senate are filed with such secretary of state.”); id. § 7.2 (establishing the 
fee of $25 for House candidates).  California also used public funds to conduct the 
primaries.  See 1907 Cal. Stat. § 9 (“The expense of providing all ballots . . . used at any 
primary election . . . and all expenses necessarily incurred . . . shall be paid out of the 
treasury of the city, city and county, county or state, as the case may be, in the same manner, 
with like effect and by the same officers as in the case of elections.”).    
 122. Act of Mar. 9, 1915, ch. 101, § 4, 1915 N.C. Sess. Laws 154, 155-56. 
 123. See People ex rel. Breckton v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of Chi., 77 N.E. 321, 324 
(Ill. 1906), overruled by People ex rel. Lindstrand v. Emmerson, 16 N.E.2d 370 (Ill. 1929) 
(striking down filing fee requirements as “purely arbitrary exactions of money”). 
 124. See DWYER, supra note 114, at tbl. 1 (reporting that the congressional salary in 
1907 was $7,500), available at  http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/97-1011.pdf.  
By way of comparison, $75 in 1907 was the equivalent (using the Consumer Price Index) of 
about $1,460 in 2003.  See SAMUEL H. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC HISTORY SERVICES, WHAT 
IS THE RELATIVE VALUE?, at http://www.eh.net/hmit/compare/ (last visited June 22, 2005) 
(on file with the American University Law Review) (calculating the relative value of past 
dollar amounts using the Consumer Price Index). 
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charged federal House candidates by Oregon in 1915.125 
Not all ballot fees at this time were reasonable.  As is still true today, 
some states charged fees that no common person could afford or meet.  
Louisiana, for example, required that congressional candidates in 1906 post 
a $250 “good faith” bond, which would be returned upon a candidate’s 
winning ten percent of the vote.126  This is the equivalent of demanding a 
$5,000 performance bond today.127  Tennessee required that senatorial 
candidates in 1910 pay a $500 ballot fee.128  Adjusted for inflation, this 
translates into about $10,000 today.129  Oregon’s $150 filing fee for 
senatorial candidates in 1915130 constituted two percent of the annual 
congressional salary at that time,131 about $3,000 by today’s standards.132 
                                                          
 125. See Act of Feb. 23, 1915, ch. 124, § 6, 1915 Or. Laws 124, 126 (listing the fees for 
each elected office); DWYER, supra note 114, at tbl. 1 (reporting that between March 4, 1905 
and March 4, 1925, the salary for a member of Congress was $7,500). 
 126. Act of June 29, 1906, No. 49, § 12, 1906 La. Acts 66, 69.  It would appear 
reasonably clear that Louisiana’s adoption of the Australian ballot in 1898, see State ex rel. 
Labauve v. Michel, 46 So. 430, 431 (La. 1908) (describing the process whereby Louisiana 
adopted the Australian ballot system), and primary mechanism in 1906, id. at 432, were in 
part racially motivated.  See FREDMAN, supra note 23, at 73 (observing that in the South in 
general, adoption of the Australian ballot flowed from “the mingled motives of 
discrimination and reform”).  The thought was that the Australian ballot would effectively 
disenfranchise illiterates, who were primarily black.  Id.  Primaries, in turn, would allow the 
two political parties to exclude black voters from effective political participation, free from 
the Fifteenth Amendment’s constraints.  Id.  Louisiana’s large candidate bond may have 
been similarly motivated. 
 127. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 124 (using the Consumer Price Index to measure 
relative value).  In today’s terms, this would constitute over one percent of the congressional 
salary.  Only Florida and Delaware today authorize or require more than three percent of the 
annual congressional salary.  See Brown, supra note 112, at 1298 (reporting that Florida 
charges six percent of the congressional salary); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 3103(b) (2004) 
(authorizing parties to set filing fees up to one percent of term’s salary, which for Senators 
was $9,000 in 2004). 
 128. See Ledgerwood v. Pitts, 125 S.W. 1036, 1045 (Tenn. 1910) (striking down fee 
requirements as unconstitutional).  The fact that the state legislature still elected Tennessee’s 
Senators at this time may have influenced this inflated figure, which was ten times the fee 
charged House candidates. 
 129. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 124 (using the Consumer Price Index to measure 
relative value).  Only Florida has charged more than $10,000 for the privilege of running for 
congressional office.  See Brown, supra note 112, at 1298 (reporting that Florida charged 
$10,020 in 1996 and lowered its fee to $8,016 in 1998).  Today, Florida charges a fee equal 
to six percent of the office’s annual salary.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.092(1) (West 2005) 
(requiring a filing fee of three percent of the annual salary, an election assessment of one 
percent of the annual salary, and a party assessment of two percent of the annual salary).  
This translates into over $9,000 for candidates seeking to run in either a House or Senate 
primary. 
 130. Act of Feb. 23, 1915, ch. 124, § 6, 1915 Or. Laws 124, 126. 
 131. See DWYER, supra note 114, at tbl. 1 (reporting that between March 4, 1905 and 
March 4, 1925, the salary for a member of Congress was $7,500).  North Dakota similarly 
charged candidates for “county and district offices” in 1907 two percent of their annual 
salaries.  See Johnson v. Grand Forks County, 113 N.W. 1071, 1071 (N.D. 1907) (striking 
down fee as property qualification to the extent that it exceeded a fee for services rendered).  
Fees for the state senate and house, however, were capped at thirty dollars and ten dollars, 
respectively.  Id. 
 132. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 124 (using the Consumer Price Index to measure 
relative value). 
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Unlike Australian ballot laws and modern primary requirements, which 
have uniformly survived constitutional attack, the filing fees of the early 
twentieth century were frequently challenged and sometimes ruled 
invalid.133  For instance, the North Dakota Supreme Court invalidated forty 
and forty-eight-dollar fees for county auditor and state treasurer, 
respectively, as (among other things) amounting to impermissible property 
qualifications:  “The law is as objectionable as if the test was based on a 
property qualification or the amount the elector had contributed to the 
public revenues.”134  The Illinois Supreme Court employed a similar 
egalitarian principle to strike down ballot fees, reasoning that “there can be 
no discrimination between candidates based upon the ground that one has 
money to pay for the privilege of being a candidate and chooses to pay, and 
another has not the means, or is unwilling to buy the privilege.”135  Several 
other state supreme courts, like Tennessee’s,136 South Dakota’s,137 
Indiana’s,138 and Nebraska’s,139 employed the Lochner-esque logic of the 
                                                          
 133. See, e.g., People ex rel. Breckton v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of Chi., 77 N.E. 321, 
325 (Ill. 1906) (nullifying an Illinois law charging fees to candidates running in primary 
elections), overruled by People ex rel. Lindstrand v. Emmerson, 165 N.E. 217, 224 (Ill. 
1929) (sustaining primary elections while strking down filing fees); Ledgerwood, 125 S.W. 
at 1036 (sustaining Tennessee’s primary election system but striking down filing fees). 
 134. Johnson, 113 N.W. at 1076.  In drawing this conclusion, the court equated 
candidates’ rights with those of voters and held that because voters could not be required “to 
pay a sum of money to any officer or to any department of government before he can vote,” 
id. at 1072, neither could a candidate be charged a fee to run for office.  Id. at 1073-74.  
North Dakota today requires that candidates collect signatures to garner a place on the ballot 
rather than pay filing fees.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-11-06 (2004). 
 135. Breckton, 77 N.E. at 324.  Illinois today requires that candidates collect signatures 
for ballot access rather than pay filing fees.  10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-10(b) (West 1993 
& Supp. 2003). 
 136. See Ledgerwood, 125 S.W. at 1046 (striking Tennessee’s ballot fee because it 
“makes an arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable classification of candidates in providing 
that persons who are able to pay the prescribed fees may enter the primary, while other men 
who are equally capable and worthy are excluded because of their pecuniary inability to pay 
the prescribed fee”).  Tennessee today requires that candidates qualify by collecting 
signatures rather than pay filing fees.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-5-101(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. 
2004). 
 137. See Ballinger v. McLaughlin, 116 N.W. 70, 71 (S.D. 1908) (finding South Dakota’s 
filing fee to be “an arbitrary tax” and “clearly unconstitutional”).  South Dakota first 
imposed a filing fee for primaries in 1907.  See id. (citing Primary Election Law of 1907, ch. 
139, § 10, 1907 S.D. Laws 291).  Fees ranged from one dollar (for nomination as a delegate 
to a state convention) to fifteen dollars (for nomination for county treasurer and sheriff).  Id.  
The court concluded that anything “in excess of a uniform nominal filing fee” is invalid.  Id.  
The court explained that the fees had no relationship to the services the elected officials 
performed and therefore a candidate running for Governor should not have to pay a larger 
fee than a candidate running for county commissioner.  Id.  South Dakota today requires that 
candidates collect signatures rather than pay fees.  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-6-7 (West 
2004). 
 138. See Kelso v. Cook, 110 N.E. 987, 997 (Ind. 1916) (invalidating filing fees that are 
arbitrarily based on candidate’s salaries).  Today, Indiana charges no fees for any of its 
offices, but requires signature collections for some.  IND. CODE ANN. § 3-8-2-8 (Michie 
2004). 
 139. See State ex rel. Adair v. Drexel, 105 N.W. 174, 179 (Neb. 1905) (striking fee that 
charged more than expense of placing name on ballot as being “arbitrary”).  Nebraska today 
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day to strike down fees as being “arbitrary” and beyond the power of 
government. 
These decisions notwithstanding, most ballot fees survived constitutional 
scrutiny over the course of the next three generations.140  Not until the 
Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Bullock v. Carter141 was the Federal 
Constitution employed to limit ballot fees.  Because of the Warren Court’s 
decisions less than ten years prior striking down poll taxes and property 
requirements for voters,142 the Burger Court’s decision in Bullock was not 
surprising.  If the Equal Protection Clause protected one side of the 
electoral process, then it ought also to protect the other.  Thus, it was only 
natural for the Court to seriously question Texas’s outlandish ballot fees in 
Bullock.  Texas’s fees varied with offices, but all shared a common 
characteristic; they were substantial.143 
Applying heightened scrutiny, the Court in Bullock unanimously 
concluded that these fees violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.144  Texas’s two justifications—insuring that only 
serious candidates run and defraying the costs of primaries—were deemed 
insufficient to justify the fees.145  In terms of funding, the Court found that 
                                                                                                                                      
uses filing fees.  NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-608(2) (2004). 
 140. See Comment, The Constitutionality of Qualifying Fees for Political Candidates, 
120 U. PA. L. REV. 109, 109 (1971) (observing that “qualifying fees, the nonpayment of 
which bars a candidate from placement on a state primary or general election ballot . . . were 
often upheld”); Connelly, supra note 110 passim (collecting cases that upheld filing fee 
requirements). 
 141. 405 U.S. 134 (1972). 
 142. See infra notes 208-212 and accompanying text (detailing the evolution from the 
validation of poll taxes to invalidating poll taxes and property requirements under Equal 
Protection analysis). 
 143. The fee for County Commissioner, for example, was $1,424.60 and for County 
Judge, the fee was $6,300.  Bullock, 405 U.S. at 135-36.  Texas’s scheme required 
candidates to “pay their filing fee to the county executive committee of the political party 
conducting the primary” and “the committee also determine[d] the amount of the fee.”  Id. 
at 137-38.  Neither of these facts insulated the fee schedules, because the court found that 
the fee requirements amounted to state action (under the Fourteenth Amendment).  Id. at 
140.  Despite the fact that the fees were limited to party primaries, the court determined that 
such fees were part of the mechanism that led to the eventual selection of state legislatures.  
Id. at 140.  Consequently, whether the state or a major party sets and collects the state’s 
ballot fees, the same constitutional analysis applies.  See, e.g., Green v. Mortham, 155 F.3d 
1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 1998), reh’g denied, Green v. Mortham, 165 F.3d 42 (11th Cir. 1998), 
and cert. denied, Green v. Mortham, 525 U.S. 1148 (analyzing a Florida state statute setting 
filing fees under a reasonableness standard); Biener v. Calio, 361 F.3d 206, 215 (3d Cir. 
2004), cert. denied, Biener v. Calio, 125 S. Ct. 55 (2004) (analyzing and upholding ballot 
access restrictions set by the Delaware Democratic Party under rational basis review). 
 144. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 144 (finding that the filing fee system had a “real and 
appreciable impact on the exercise of the franchise”). 
 145. Id. at 147-48.  The Court explained that it 
reject[ed] the theory that since the candidates are availing themselves of the 
primary machinery, it is appropriate that they pay that share of the cost that they 
have occasioned. . . . [T]he costs do not arise because candidates decide to enter a 
primary or because the parties decide to conduct one, but because the State has, as 
a matter of legislative choice, directed that party primaries be held. 
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the only constitutionally acceptable choice was to socialize the costs of 
primaries.146  States might charge fees, but they could not demand them 
simply to offset the cost of elections.  In terms of deterrence, the Court 
hinted that non-monetary restrictions might be more effective.147  
Nevertheless, the Bullock Court did not fully resolve the legality of ballot 
fees.  In particular, it left open the possibility that smaller fees might 
survive.148 
Two years later, in Lubin v. Panish149 the Court addressed a relatively 
modest California requirement that House primary candidates pay a fee 
equal to one percent ($425) of the congressional salary.  California asserted 
that the fee was needed to “keep the ballot from being overwhelmed with 
frivolous or otherwise nonserious candidates.”150  The Court rejected 
California’s claim, concluding that even California’s modest fee was 
relatively inefficient in terms of screening out frivolous candidates.151  
Consequently, by the mid-1970s it became clear that states could not rely 
solely on filing fees to limit their ballots.  Instead, reasonable non-monetary 
alternatives, such as waivers and signature collections, were constitutional 
necessities.152  Reasonable fees would survive, but only if paired with non-
                                                                                                                                      
Id. 
 146. Id. at 148 (emphasizing that because the goal is to give voters in the primary stage 
some influence over who gets nominated, the cost should be spread out among the voters in 
order to ensure that wealth does not have a disproportionate impact). 
 147. Id. at 146. 
 148. Id. at 149 (hinting that in “other contexts” the Court might find reasonable filing 
fees or licensing fees valid). 
 149. 415 U.S. 709 (1974). 
 150. Id. at 714. 
 151. Id. at 717 (“A large filing fee may serve the legitimate function of keeping ballots 
manageable but, standing alone, it is not a certain test of whether the candidacy is serious or 
spurious . . . .  We have also noted that prohibitive filing fees, such as those in Bullock, can 
effectively exclude serious candidates.”).  Although Bullock and Lubin speak often to equal 
protection, heightened scrutiny in both cases appears predicated largely on the First 
Amendment norm of free political participation.  One has a right to associate with others for 
political ends, which necessarily includes running for office.  It is the fundamental nature of 
this right, together with correlative rights of voters to choose their representatives, which 
leads to increased judicial scrutiny.  Although the Court has best analyzed the political 
applications of the First Amendment in the context of minor parties and independent 
candidates attempting to access general election ballots, see JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. 
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 867 (5th ed. 1995) (analyzing ballot restrictions in light of 
First Amendment and Equal Protection analyses), it appears clear that these same principles 
apply with at least the same force where primaries are at stake. 
 152. See, e.g., Andress v. Reed, 880 F.2d 239, 241 (9th Cir. 1989) (sustaining 
California’s 10,000 signature alternative which was adopted in response to Lubin, 415 U.S. 
at 709); Harper v. Vance, 342 F. Supp. 136, 144 n.9 (N.D. Ala. 1972) (striking down 
Alabama’s flat $850 filing fee for Senatorial election and suggesting an exception that 
would “permit financially unable candidates to qualify by demonstrating their inability to 
pay”); Belitskus v. Pizzingrilli, 343 F.3d 632, 646 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that Pennsylvania 
ballot access law requiring a fee and lacking a non-monetary alternative violated the Equal 
Protection Clause).  See generally Kevin Cofsky, Comment, Pruning the Political Thicket:  
The Case for Strict Scrutiny of State Ballot Access Restrictions, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 353, 
377-78 & n.114 (1996) (arguing that states presumably must provide an alternative to filing 
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monetary access mechanisms. 
                                                                                                                                      
fees even if the fee amount is reasonable).  It has also become clear that states cannot force 
parties and candidates to finance primaries.  See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 146-49 
(1972) (declaring that the cost of primaries should be spread among the voters, and that 
costs arise because states decide to hold primaries, not because candidates choose to run).  
Republican Party of Arkansas v. Faulkner County, presents a more recent application of this 
principle.  49 F.3d 1289 (8th Cir. 1995).  There, the Eighth Circuit struck down an Arkansas 
statute that required political parties to conduct and pay for primary elections, reasoning that 
parties with limited resources would be disadvantaged and that the resulting disparity in 
polling places unconstitutionally prevented individuals from voting.  Id. at 1291.  Whether 
by an outright funding requirement or by an unduly large filing fee, the rule is clear; a state 
cannot shift the entire monetary cost of political primaries to parties and candidates. 
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II. THE MODERN STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
Several states153 abandoned ballot fees following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Lubin.154  Because Bullock and Lubin did not hold ballot fees 
impermissible, a larger number of states simply added non-monetary 
alternatives.  Rather than abolish or reduce its ballot fees for congressional 
offices, for example, Texas merely added non-monetary alternatives.155 As 
                                                          
 153. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-322.A.2 (1956) (requiring that candidates for Congress 
collect signatures from 0.5% of registered party members in the district); COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 1-4-801(2)(b) (2004) (necessitating that candidates for the general assembly, district 
attorney, or any district office higher than county office amass 1000 signatures); 10 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-10(b) (West 1993) (providing that candidates seeking to run for 
United States Congress gather signatures from 0.5% of qualified primary voters that are 
party members in the district); IOWA CODE § 43.20.1.C (1999) (mandating that a candidate 
for Congress obtain signatures from two percent of voters of the candidate’s party in at least 
half of the counties in the district, and not less than one percent of total vote of the 
candidate’s party in the district); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 21-A, § 335.5.C (West 1964) 
(commanding at least 1000 signatures from voters in district for candidates for Congress); 
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 53, § 6 (Law. Co-op. 1990) (establishing that candidates for Congress 
must receive 2000 signatures to be placed on the ballot); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.544f 
(2004) (charting the required number of partisan, non partisan, and qualifying petitions by 
total population of the district); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:23-8 (1999) (prescribing that 
congressional candidates acquire two hundred signatures from party members in district 
who voted in last election); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-8-33.B (Michie 1978) (stating that 
candidates for Congress must amass signatures from two percent of party voters in last 
gubernatorial election or from seventy-seven voters, whichever is greater, to receive 
preprimary convention designation); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-136.2(g) (McKinney 1998) 
(setting the number of required signatures from party members in district at 1,250 for 
congressional office); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-11-06 (2004) (dictating that candidates for 
U.S. Senator, U.S. Representative, or state office, except state senator, representative, or 
judge of supreme or district court, submit a list of at least 300 signatures of qualified voters 
to the secretary of state); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-6-7 (Michie 2004) (requiring that the 
nominating petition list the signatures of one percent of party voters who participated in last 
gubernatorial election in the county, part of the county, district, or state); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 2-5-101(b)(1) (Supp. 2004) (announcing that candidates must collect twenty five 
signatures); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2355 (2002) (instructing that candidates for state and 
congressional offices gather 500 signatures from voters); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 8.15(6)(b) 
(West 2004) (proclaiming that a candidate for Congress accumulate 1000 signatures from 
voters in the district).  Indiana charges neither a fee nor demands signature collection to 
access primary ballots for House elections.  IND. CODE ANN. § 3-8-2-7 (West 2003) 
(indicating that person must declare candidacy by providing, among other things, name, 
address, party affiliation, and statement regarding eligibility to run for office).  Although the 
precise number of signatures varies between states and offices, states that have dispensed 
with fees commonly require up to 1,000 signatures for congressional (House) races.  See 
generally Brown, supra note 112, at 1284 n.11 (cataloging the sixteen states that do not 
currently require a filing fee and listing the five states that require both a fee and signatures 
for primary ballot access).  The number of signatures needed for Senatorial races is 
generally larger.  California, for example, requires that Senatorial candidates collect 10,000 
signatures.  CAL. ELEC. CODE § 8106(a)(3) (West 2003).  Only 3000 signatures are needed 
for the federal House.  Id. § 8106(a)(2). 
 154. See Lubin, 415 U.S. at 712 (stating that the seriousness of a candidate could be 
measured by non-monetary means).  A larger percentage of states rely solely on signature 
collection for presidential primaries and elections.  See Trevor Potter & Marianne H. Viray, 
Barriers to Participation, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 547, 577-83 tbl. 1 (2003) (indicating 
that at least twenty-two states rely solely on signature collection to access presidential 
ballots). 
 155. Compare Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 140 (1972) (assessing a $1,000 fee for 
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demonstrated below,156 the composite following Bullock and Lubin thus 
does not differ too much from before:  fees remain a staple throughout the 
United States.  Further, ballot fees can be steep (if not unreasonable under 
the Fourteenth Amendment); it is not uncommon for charges for federal 
office to reach into the thousands of dollars. 
Because the Constitution delegates electoral regulatory authority to the 
individual states,157 exact procedures and conditions vary around the nation.  
In terms of structure, states today generally require that major parties 
conduct primaries, the winners of which then face off in general 
elections.158  Minor party159 and independent160 candidates are allowed to 
participate in general elections if they can demonstrate some specified 
modicum of support, generally a rough approximation of the primary 
demands placed on major party candidates.161  The support needed 
                                                                                                                                      
federal senatorial ballot access in 1972), with TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 172.024(a)(1), (3) 
(Vernon 2003) (requiring a $5,000 filing fee for federal Senate candidates and a $3,125 
filing fee for federal House candidates in 2005).  Texas today alternatively allows signature 
collections.  See TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 172.025 (Vernon 2003) (stating that candidate 
must collect 5,000 signatures for statewide office and for district either 500 or “two percent 
of the total vote received in the district, county, or precinct, as applicable, by all the 
candidates for governor in the most recent gubernatorial general election”). 
 156. See infra notes 157-195 and accompanying text. 
 157. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving to states powers not expressly allowed the 
federal government); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (granting state legislatures the authority to 
define the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (providing that “[e]ach State shall appoint, 
in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors”).  Although 
Congress has the power to overrule state regulations of federal congressional elections under 
Article I, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (stating that “Congress may at any time by Law 
make or alter such Regulations”), it has for the most part refused to intervene. 
 158. See Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 207 (1996) (observing that 
“most states [have] effectively divided [their] election laws into two stages, the first 
consisting of the selection of party candidates and the second being the general election 
itself”).  Only four states appear to fall outside this model.  Virginia allows parties to select 
nominees by primary, convention, or other method.  VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-509(A) (West 
1993).  Utah, New Mexico, and Connecticut, hold primaries only when more than one 
candidate at the pre-primary convention receives a significant modicum of support.  See 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-381 - 9-450 (West 1958) (describing caucus, procedure for 
ties, and timing with respect to primary); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-8-33 (1978) (stating pre-
primary convention requirements); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-9-403 (2004) (stating that 
parties must choose to use primary system).  In New Mexico, a candidate who did not 
receive enough support at the convention to qualify for the primary can still gain access by 
collecting signatures from four percent of the party’s electors in the last gubernatorial 
election in the state or congressional district.  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-8-33(D) (1978). 
 159. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.096(2), (3)(b) (West 2002) (requiring that minor 
party candidate slated by party pay filing fee to run in general election or alternatively 
collect signatures equal to one percent of registered voters in district). 
 160. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.0955(2), (3)(b) (West 2002) (stating that an 
independent candidate may have his or her name placed on general ballot by paying a filing 
fee equal to four percent of the annual salary of the office sought or if supported by 
signatures from one percent of registered voters in district). 
 161. Laws that force minor party and independent candidates to pay more or collect 
significantly more signatures than major party candidates encounter constitutional problems.  
See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793 (1983) (explaining that a “burden that falls 
unequally on new or small political parties or on independent candidates impinges, by its 
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ordinarily takes the form of paying the same filing fee or collecting an 
equivalent number of signatures.  Write-in candidates are sometimes 
allowed,162 though they have no constitutional right to participate in either 
primaries or general elections.163 
Of those states that have retained filing fees for state offices and 
congressional elections, all but a handful have implemented some form of 
alternative access.164  Five provide outright waivers to those candidates 
who are “indigent” or “unable” to pay the stated fee.165  More commonly, 
                                                                                                                                      
very nature, on associational choices protected by the First Amendment”); Fulani v. 
Krivanek, 973 F.2d 1539, 1547 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that a Florida law could not 
exclude minor parties, defined as those parties that have less than five percent of registered 
voters, from a provision that allowed all other candidates to waive a signature verification 
fee if the fee posed an undue burden on financial resources).  But see LaRouche v. Kezer, 
990 F.2d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 1993) (sustaining media recognition statute that authorized the 
exclusion from presidential ballot of minor candidates who were not generally recognized 
by press, because candidates who were not recognized by the media but collected the 
signatures of one percent of their party’s registered voters could still be placed on the ballot 
under a petition alternative statute). 
 162. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.061(3)(a) (West 2002) (permitting write-in 
candidates to submit qualification papers any time after noon of the first day but before 
noon on the last day of the qualifying period).  Some states require that write-in candidates 
register in advance in order to have their votes counted.  See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 168.737a (West 2004) (requiring registration by 4 p.m. on the Friday preceding election); 
MINN. STAT. § 204B.09(3)(a) (1992) (declaring that write-in declarations must be filed at 
least five days before election); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3513.041 (Anderson 1996) 
(mandating that write-in candidates register fifty days in advance of election); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 29A.24.311 (Supp. 2005) (demanding registration at least by the day preceding 
election).  Maine and the District of Columbia allow write-in candidates to declare their 
candidacies even after the elections are over.  See D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1001.08(3) (2001) 
(explaining that write-in candidate can declare candidacy no later than 4:45 p.m. on the 
seventh day after the election); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 21-A, § 722-A (West Supp. 2004) 
(allowing candidate to submit declaration of intent three business days after the election). 
 163. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441 (1992) (asserting that Hawaii’s 
prohibition of write-in voting imposes no unconstitutional burdens under First and 
Fourteenth Amendments). 
 164. Those states that continue to charge ballot fees without expressly providing 
alternative access include Kentucky, see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118.255(1) (Banks-Baldwin 
1994) (prescribing a $500 filing fee for congressional candidates); Mississippi, see MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 23-15-297 (2001) (assessing $300, $200, $100, $15, or $10 filing fee 
depending on office sought); Nevada, see NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.193.1 (2003) (requiring a 
$300 filing fee for representatives in Congress, Governors, and Justices of the Supreme 
Court); Ohio, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3513.10(A) & (B) (Anderson 1996) (maintaining 
that congressional candidates pay eighty-five dollars when filing a declaration of 
candidacy); South Carolina, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-13-40 (Law. Co-op. 1977) 
(establishing filing fee equal to one percent of congressional salary for full term of office); 
and Wyoming, see WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-208(a)(ii) (2003) (dictating that candidates who 
are voted for by electors wholly within one county pay twenty-five dollars, while candidates 
who are voted for by the entire state pay a $200 fee).  Because some form of exception to 
the monetary filing fee is required by Bullock, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), and Lubin, 415 U.S. 
709 (1974), the constitutionality of these arrangements is questionable.  See, e.g., Belitskus 
v. Pizzingrilli, 343 F.3d 632, 650 (3d Cir. 2003) (requiring that Pennsylvania provide an 
alternative to filing fee for those who would be subjected to a financial hardship). 
 165. See ALA. CODE § 17-16-15 (1995) (allowing waiver of filing fee for “those able to 
pay”); ALASKA STAT. § 15.25.050(a) (Michie 2004) (providing that “[a]n indigent person 
may file a statement of indigency . . . in place of the filing fee”); ALASKA ADM. CODE tit. 6, 
§ 25.130 (2005) (stating that “[a]ny person who is unable to pay the filing fee for candidacy, 
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fee-charging states authorize candidates to alternatively collect 
signatures.166  States that authorize signature collection as alternatives to 
ballot fees tend to demand significantly more signatures than states that 
rely solely on signature collection.167  For example, Florida in 1996 
demanded signatures from three percent of the registered and eligible 
electorate,168 which translated to, on average, almost 4,000 signatures for 
congressional (House) primaries.169  Georgia in 1996 required, on average, 
over 2,500 signatures for its House primaries.170  California continues to 
require 3,000 signatures for congressional (House) primaries.171  States that 
rely solely on signature collection, in contrast, generally require no more 
than 1,000 signatures for House races.172  Only five non-monetary states 
stray beyond this 1,000-signature ceiling,173 with Massachusetts’s 
requirement of 2,000 signatures at the apex.174 
                                                                                                                                      
and still provide for the necessities of life, may file as an indigent candidate”); MD. ELEC. 
LAW § 5-401(c) (2003) (stating that “filing fee . . . shall be waived if the candidate 
establishes inability to pay the fee” and that “a candidate may demonstrate inability to pay 
the filing fee by attaching . . . a sworn statement . . . set[ting] forth:  (i) the nature, extent, 
and liquidity of the candidate’s assets; and (ii) the candidate’s disposable net income”); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-608(5) (2004) (disposing of fee for a “pauper,” defined as “a person 
whose income and other resources for maintenance are found under assistance standards to 
be insufficient for meeting the cost of his or her requirements and whose reserve of cash or 
other available resources does not exceed the maximum available resources that an eligible 
individual may own”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-9-201(6)(d) (2003) (waiving fee for persons 
“unable to pay” upon filing of affidavit of “impecuniosity”). 
 166. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 8106(a)(2) (West 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, 
§ 3103(d)(1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.095(1) (West 2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-132(g) 
(2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 12-6(e) (2003); IDAHO CODE § 34-626(b) (Michie 2001); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 25-4502(b) LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:465.C(3)(b) (West 2004); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 204B.11(2)(b) (Supp. 2005); MO. REV. STAT. § 115.357.3 (2003); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 13-10-203(2)(b) (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 655:19-c.III (1996); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 163-107.1(c) (2e003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 5-112 (1997); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 
172.025(2)(B) (Vernon 2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.24.091 (Supp. 2005); W. VA. CODE 
§ 3-5-8(a) (Michie 2002). 
 167. See Brown, supra note 112, at 1305-06 (observing that most pure signature states 
require 1,000 or less signatures, and that all but one state requires less than 1,500 signatures, 
and stating that “[u]nlike states which use signatures as the alternative, . . . pure signature 
states tend to require substantially fewer signatures”). 
 168. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.095(3) (West 1996).  Florida has since relaxed its requirement 
to one percent of the registered and eligible electorate.  See 1999 Fla. Sess. Laws Serv. 99-
318 (West 2000). 
 169. See Brown, supra note 112, at 1299 n.77 (noting that the number of signatures 
varied depending on the party and the district). 
 170. Id. at 1300 & n.85. 
 171. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 8106(a)(2) (West 2003); see also CAL. ELEC. CODE § 8106(a)(3) 
(West 2003) (requiring 10,000 signatures for Senatorial campaigns); Andress v. Reed, 880 
F.2d 239, 242 (9th Cir. 1989) (reasoning that collecting 10,000 signatures within forty-five 
days was reasonable and constitutionally adequate).  See generally Brown, supra note 112, 
at 1305 nn.102-03 (listing the number of signatures required by those states where signature 
collection is alternative to filing fee). 
 172. See Brown, supra note 112, at 1306 (indicating that “a consensus of states have 
found [1,000 signatures or less] manageable”). 
 173. See id. at 1306 nn.105-06 (indicating that Michigan, New Mexico, New York, and 
South Dakota require between 1,000 and 1,500 votes). 
 174. See MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 53, § 44 (Law. Co-op. 2005) (stating that nomination 
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Most of the states today that authorize signature collections as alternative 
forms of ballot access for state and congressional offices make it available 
to all potential candidates.  Rich, poor, and middle-class candidates are all 
treated alike.  They can pay the fee or collect signatures.  Eight states, 
however, restrict their signature collection alternatives to poor candidates:  
those candidates that are either “unable” to pay the required fee or are 
otherwise “indigent.”175 
Poverty definitions vary among states that either waive fees completely 
or condition the availability of signature collection alternatives.  Of the five 
states that provide outright waivers, three require some form of “inability to 
pay.”176  Two limit their waivers to “indigents”177 and “paupers,”178 
respectively, without describing or defining these terms.  Of the eight states 
that condition their signature collection alternatives on some measure of 
poverty, five require what amounts to an “inability to pay.”179  Two of the 
three remaining states require “indigen[ce]”180 and “poverty,”181 
respectively, without specifically attaching income or ownership limits to 
either term.  Delaware alone sets a specific monetary ceiling on who 
qualifies for the state’s signature collection alternative.  In order to qualify 
to collect signatures in Delaware, a candidate must “receiv[e] benefits 
under the Supplemental Security Income Program for Aged, Blind and 
Disabled under Subchapter XVI of Chapter 7 of Title 42 of the United 
States Code” or qualify under the federal “income and resources tests for 
such benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a), as applied to Delaware 
                                                                                                                                      
“shall be by nomination papers” and that candidates for state House primaries shall collect 
at least two thousand signatures). 
 175. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 3103(e).  Indigents are those who 
receiv[e] benefits under the Supplemental Security Income Program for Aged, 
Blind and Disabled under Subchapter XVI of Chapter 7 of Title 42 of the United 
States Code . . . or if the Commissioner determines that such person meets the 
income and resources tests for such benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a), as applied 
to Delaware residents. 
Id. See GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-132(g) (2003) (obligating the candidate to, “under oath[,] 
affirm his or her poverty and his or her resulting inability to pay the qualifying fee”); 
HAWAII REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-6(e) (2003) (providing that there must be a declaration “by 
affidavit, that the person is indigent”); MO. REV. STAT. § 115.357.3 (2003) (requiring that 
candidate must file a declaration stipulating “inability to pay”); Mont. Code. Ann. § 13-10-
203 (2003) (requiring a “verified statement that he is unable to pay the filing fee”); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 655:20 (1996) (authorizing signature collection by candidates 
who are “unable to pay the filing fee . . . by reason of indigency”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 29A.24.091 (West Supp. 2005) (waiving filing fee for “candidate who lacks sufficient 
assets or income at the time of filing to pay”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-5-8a (Michie 2002) 
(mandating “oath . . . stating that he is unable to pay the filing fee due to a lack of financial 
resources”). 
 176. See supra note 165. 
 177. See supra note 165 (describing Alabama’s alternative). 
 178. See supra note 165 (describing Nebraska’s alternative). 
 179. See supra note 175. 
 180. See supra note 175 (describing Hawaii’s alternative). 
 181. See supra note 175 (describing Georgia’s alternative). 
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residents.”182  For the 2002 election, this meant that only persons with less 
than $13,080 in earned income (or $6,450 in “unearned” income) qualified 
for Delaware’s signature collection alternative.183 
Restrictions on presidential candidates follow the patterns described 
above, though states sometimes modify their rules for presidential contests.  
Ohio, for example, requires that candidates for state and congressional 
offices pay filing fees.  Presidential candidates, in contrast, are not charged 
a fee, but are required to gather 1,000 signatures in order to run in the 
state’s two major party primaries.184  For the most part, states tend to rely 
more on signature collections for presidential elections than for 
congressional contests.  At least twenty-two states use signatures alone to 
restrict their presidential primary ballots.185  The number of required 
signatures varies widely, ranging from 300 in Nebraska186 to 15,000 in 
New York.187  Many states require signatures together with fees,188 a 
                                                          
 182. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 3103(e) (1999) (stipulating that claimant must 
provide personal income tax returns, bank records, and credit reports). 
 183. See Biener v. Calio, 209 F. Supp. 2d 405, 407 n.2 (D. Del. 2002) (calculating the 
2002 eligibility income thresholds under 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)).  The federal Supplemental 
Security Income (“SSI”) Program is designed to achieve only minimal subsidence levels.  
See generally Ruppert v. Bowen, 871 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir. 1989) (examining the impact of in-
kind support and maintenance on the calculation of benefits for the elderly, blind, and 
disabled under the SSI Program).  Federal SSI eligibility income amounts, however, do not 
equate to the federal government’s “poverty threshold.”  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, 2002 POVERTY THRESHOLDS, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
SUPPLEMENT (2003) (showing that a family could earn significantly more than $13,080, the 
2002 SSI eligibility amount for Delaware, and still be deemed poor under the federal 
poverty threshold), available at www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/threshld/thresh02.html (last 
visited June 22, 2005).  Thus, Delaware candidates whose income fell below the federal 
poverty threshold but exceeded the SSI ceiling would still be required to pay a filing fee for 
elective office. 
 184. See OHIO REV. CODE § 3513.10 (Anderson 1996).  By way of contrast, independent 
candidates must gather 5,000 signatures in order to access Ohio’s general presidential 
election ballot.  See OHIO REV. CODE § 3513.257(A) (Anderson 1996).  Whether this 
disparate treatment survives First and Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny is beyond the scope 
of this Article.  See supra note 161 (addressing laws that require more from minor party and 
independent candidates than from major party candidates). 
 185. See Potter & Viray, supra note 154, at 577 tbl. 1 (listing filing fees, petition 
requirements, and controlling statutes for each state). 
 186. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-613 (2004) (stating that a presidential candidate must 
acquire 100 signatures from each of Nebraska’s three congressional districts). 
 187. See N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-136 (McKinney 1998) (requiring 15,000 signatures for 
presidential primary); cf. Rockefeller v. Powers, 917 F. Supp. 155, 160 (E.D.N.Y 1996), 
aff’d, 78 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 1996) (arguing that a law requiring 1,250 signatures or five 
percent of registered voters, whichever is less, be secured in each congressional district for 
the candidate’s name to be placed on presidential ballots was invalid because the scheme 
required that candidates make excessive efforts to reach most districts would have to collect 
37,000 signatures to be placed on every district’s ballot). 
 188. See ALA. CODE § 17-16a-3-4 (1995) (delegating to parties the power to set and 
assess fees and also requiring 500 signatures); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 3184 (1999) 
(delegating to parties power to impose fees and requiring 500 signatures); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 118.611, 118.591 (Banks-Baldwin 1998) (imposing a $1,000 filing fee and 
requiring 5,000 signatures); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2702 (2002) (requiring $2,000 fee and 
1,000 signatures). 
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feature seldom seen outside the presidential arena.  The fee amounts vary,  
ranging from $100 in Kansas189 to $10,000 in South Carolina190 and 
Arkansas.191 
As with congressional contests, states that charge fees for presidential 
primaries most often allow alternative access, either through waivers192 or 
signature collections.193  However, a handful of states have failed to 
authorize any form of non-monetary alternative access.194  One interesting 
twist not found in other electoral arenas is that a dozen states, like Florida, 
leave it to public officials and committees, relying on media coverage, to 
select the presidential candidates who will appear on the major parties’ 
primary ballots.195 
                                                          
 189. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-4502(b) (2000).  By way of contrast, Kansas requires that 
candidates for state and congressional office pay fees equal to one percent of the office’s 
annual salary.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-206(a) (2002). 
 190. See Potter & Viray, supra note 154, at 582 tbl. 1 (stating that the Republican Party 
in South Carolina charged a mandatory $10,000 fee in the 2000 election). 
 191. See id. at 577 tbl. 1 (stating that Republican Party in Arkansas imposed a $10,000 
filing fee in 2000).  Arkansas delegates to parties the power to establish and set fees.  ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 7-7-201(b)(5) (Michie 2000).  Fees tend to reach their zenith when set by the 
parties.  See Potter & Viray, supra note 154, at 577-82 tbl. 1 (revealing that all fees over 
$2500 were charged by parties).  The fact that filing fees are set or charged by political 
parties rather than by the government, however, does not alter the constitutional calculus.  
See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 138 (1972) (striking down Texas filing fees that were 
set by political parties conducting the elections). 
 192. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 115.761.1 (West 2003) (charging $1,000 filing fee for 
presidential primary unless candidate is unable to pay); ALA. CODE § 17-16-15 (1995) 
(permitting parties to assess fees on candidates who are able to pay).  See generally Potter & 
Viray, supra note 154, at 577-1583 tbl. 1 (indicating which states provide an option between 
filing fees or petitions). 
 193. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-4502(b) (2000) (alternatively charging a $100 fee 
or requiring 1,000 signatures).  See generally Potter & Viray, supra note 154, at 577-83 tbl. 
1 (presenting in table format a state by state survey of mandatory and optional filing fees 
and petition requirements). 
 194. Arkansas, for example, which has delegated the power to accept and process 
applications to the parties, provides no express mechanism for waiver of any fees the parties 
may charge.  See ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-7-201(b)(5) (Michie 2000) (leaving to the political 
parties nearly all responsibility for determining who may run on their respective ballots); see 
also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 118.611, 118.591 (Banks-Baldwin 2003) (requiring $1,000 fee 
and also 5,000 signatures and recognizing no alternative to payment of the fee); 25 PA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. XXV §§ 2872.1, 2873 (West 1994) (requiring 2,000 signatures and a $200 
fee with no mechanism for waiver); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-13-40 (Law. Co-op. 1977) 
(requiring fee equal to one percent of salary for full term of office or $100, whichever is 
greater, and providing no exception); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 191.002 (Vernon 2003) 
(delegating to parties the power to determine qualifications for placing their candidates’ 
names on their ballots and mandating no waiver or exception if parties require payment of a 
fee); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2702 (2002) (requiring $2,000 fee unless “the candidate and 
the candidate’s campaign committee are without sufficient funds to pay the filing fee, the 
secretary of state shall waive all but $300.00 of the payment of the filing fee by that 
candidate”).  All of these laws are questionable under Bullock and Lubin.  See Belitskus v. 
Pizzingrilli, 343 F.3d 632, 651 (3d Cir. 2003) (striking down Pennsylvania filing fee for 
state office to extent it provided no waiver). 
 195. See DIVISION OF ELECTIONS, FLA. DEP’T OF STATE, 2004 FEDERAL QUALIFYING 
HANDBOOK 3 (2003) (explaining the process by which a candidate’s name may be removed 
from the primary ballot if members of a selection committee agree), available at 
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/publications/pdf/2004FedQualHand.pdf  (last visited June 22, 
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III. COMPARING PROPERTY QUALIFICATIONS 
As explained above,196 the Equal Protection analysis found in Bullock 
and Lubin is generally understood to require some form of non-monetary 
ballot access for state and federal elections.  The Third Circuit in Belitskus 
v. Pizzingrilli,197 for example, recently invalidated Pennsylvania’s $100 and 
$200 filing fees for local offices because they lacked exceptions or 
alternatives.198  However, Bullock and Lubin have not been interpreted to 
preclude states from charging substantial fees.  In Green v. Mortham,199 the 
Eleventh Circuit, in light of Florida’s generally available signature 
collection alternative, sustained Florida’s $10,020 filing fee for 
congressional office.200 
Lower courts, moreover, have not read Bullock and Lubin to require non-
monetary alternative access for all candidates.  In Biener v. Calio,201 the 
same Third Circuit that invalidated Pennsylvania’s fees for want of any 
exceptions sustained Delaware’s non-monetary alternative that was  
available only to candidates who earned less than $13,080.202  Nor have 
lower courts demanded realistic alternatives.  The court in Green v. 
Mortham, after sustaining Florida’s $10,000-plus fee for congressional 
office, found that Florida’s signature collection alternative—which 
required, on average, about 4,000 signatures for House primaries—was  
reasonable under Bullock and Lubin.203  The fact that few candidates were 
able to collect such a large number of signatures did not convince the court 
that the number was constitutionally problematic.204 
The lesson from cases like Green and Biener is that any waiver or 
                                                                                                                                      
2005); Potter & Viray, supra note 154, at 556 (relaying that “statutes in twelve states require 
the Secretary of State or a selection committee, with the Secretary of State often acting as 
chair, to place on the ballot only those presidential candidates generally recognized as 
candidates by the national and/or local media.”).  The validity of these laws falls beyond the 
scope of this Article.  See generally LaRouche v. Kezer, 990 F.2d 36, 39 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(sustaining a media recognition statute that authorized inclusion on presidential ballot of 
minor candidates who were generally recognized by press as an alternative to submitting 
signed petitions). 
 196. See supra notes 149-152 and accompanying text. 
 197. 343 F.3d at 632. 
 198. See id. at 644 (reasoning that the mandatory fees placed a severe burden on the 
rights of indigent candidates and their supporters). 
 199. 155 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 200. See id. (finding no evidence that the increased fee had reduced the numbers of 
candidates filing for office and concluding that the alternative petition method was not 
onerous). 
 201. 361 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 202. See id. at 212-15 (noting that Equal Protection jurisprudence requires alternatives to 
fees only for those who are unable to pay). 
 203. 155 F.3d at 1337 (recalling that the Supreme Court had upheld petition standards 
for minor parties requiring collections of more signatures within shorter periods of time). 
 204. Id.  See Brown, supra note 112, at 1299-1300 (observing that in 1992, 1994, and 
1996, only one in four of the 204 House primary candidates in Florida qualified under this 
signature alternative).  The other three-quarters resorted to paying Florida’s ballot fee.  Id. 
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exception will do under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, even if the 
alternative is legally or realistically impossible for most candidates.  While 
I do not agree that the Third and Eleventh Circuits are correct in their 
interpretations of Bullock and Lubin, I must concede that their views 
accurately reflect the dominant judicial philosophy today.205  Courts simply 
have refused to employ the Equal Protection Clause’s comparative tools to 
invalidate either unreasonable ballot fees or unrealistic non-monetary 
alternatives.  The end result is a composite of substantial ballot fees without 
adequate alternative access, all with the blessings of the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
A. Equal Protection Limitations on Property Qualifications 
As explained above, property qualifications for electors and candidates 
date to the founding of the Republic.206  Indeed, they persisted well into the 
Twentieth Century.  As late as 1951, for example, the Supreme Court had 
no difficulty summarily affirming a Virginia poll tax.207  It was not until the 
adoption of the Twenty-fourth Amendment in 1964 that poll taxes were 
outlawed in federal elections.208  Two years later in Harper v. Virginia 
State Board of Elections209 the Supreme Court ruled that poll taxes in state 
elections violated the Equal Protection Clause.  After the Supreme Court’s 
1969 decision in Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15,210 which 
struck down a New York school board election law requiring voters to 
either have children in the schools or possess taxable real property, and its 
                                                          
 205. But see Dixon v. Md. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 878 F.2d 776, 786 (4th 
Cir. 1989) (striking down Maryland filing fee for local office even though it provided a 
waiver for indigents). 
 206. See supra notes 44-46, 55-57 and accompanying text. 
 207. See Butler v. Thompson, 341 U.S. 937, 937 (1951) (affirming without opinion the 
lower court’s judgment upholding Virginia poll tax); see also Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 
277, 279-80 (1937) (sustaining Georgia poll tax applicable to all males between the ages of 
twenty-one and sixty and exempting blind individuals and females who chose not to 
register). 
 208. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1. 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election 
for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for 
Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax. 
Id. 
 209. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).  The federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 also cast doubt on the 
use of poll taxes in state elections.  See CRS ANALYSIS, supra note 66, at 1875-76 (noting 
that Voting Rights Act of 1965 “impugned the continuing validity of the poll tax as a 
qualification in state elections”) (footnote omitted).  The federal government brought several 
suits under the Voting Rights Act to overturn poll taxes charged in state elections.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Tex., 252 F. Supp. 234, 255 (W.D. Tex.), aff’d on other grounds, 384 U.S. 
155 (1966) (concluding that poll tax was invalid under Harper).  
 210. 395 U.S. 621 (1969); see Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969) 
(invalidating a Louisiana requirement that voters in an election to approve a revenue bond 
must be property taxpayers). 
BROWN OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  2:42:19 PM 
1314 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1283 
1970 opinion in Phoenix v. Kolodzieiski,211 which struck down Arizona’s 
property taxpayer requirement for general bond elections, it was generally 
understood that property ownership and taxpayer requirements for voters 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.212 
In 1970, the Supreme Court cautiously extended this reasoning from 
voters to elected and appointed officials in Turner v. Fouche.213  Though 
noting that it was not “excluding the possibility that other circumstances 
might present themselves in which a property qualification for office-
holding could survive constitutional scrutiny,”214 the Court in Turner 
invalidated under the Equal Protection Clause a Georgia freeholder 
requirement for local school board membership.215 
Because of Turner’s careful language, the Court’s application of only a 
rational basis test, and the long-standing precedent sustaining lengthy 
residence requirements for state office-holders216 (as opposed to 
electors),217 Turner left open the possibility of property requirements for 
elected officials.218  A minimal freeholder requirement, after all, is only 
slightly more burdensome than a seven-year residence requirement.219  
Representatives, moreover, had historically been subjected to qualifications 
that were not applied to electors.220  Thus, demanding property of 
representatives, but not of voters, could be rationalized by historical 
example. 
However, following the Supreme Court’s summary reversal of a lower 
court’s judgment sustaining a Louisiana freeholder requirement for 
                                                          
 211. 399 U.S. 204 (1970). 
 212. But see Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 
735 (1973) (upholding California law allowing only landowners to vote in water storage 
district elections); Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 372 (1981) (sustaining “one-acre-one-vote” 
scheme for electing directors of Arizona water district). 
 213. 396 U.S. 346 (1970). 
 214. Id. at 364. 
 215. See id. (holding that the requirement of owning real property failed to advance any 
rational state interest). 
 216. See, e.g., Chimento v. Stark, 414 U.S. 802, 802 (1973) (upholding New 
Hampshire’s seven-year residence requirement for gubernatorial candidates); Kanapaux v. 
Ellisor, 419 U.S. 891, 891 (1974) (affirming five-year residence requirement for South 
Carolina candidates for governor); Sununu v. Stark, 420 U.S. 958, 958 (1975) (sustaining 
seven-year residence requirement for New Hampshire state senator). 
 217. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 330 (1972) (striking down one-year 
residence requirement for franchise on the basis it did not advance any compelling state 
interest).  But see Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 684-85 (1973) (declaring fifty-day 
residence requirement, coupled with cut-off of voter registration fifty days prior to election, 
valid in order to permit accurate preparation of voter rolls). 
 218. 396 U.S. at 362 (refraining from deciding whether requirements for office 
holders—as opposed to voters—required the support of a compelling state interest). 
 219. See Chappelle v. Greater Baton Rouge Airport Dist., 431 U.S. 159, 159-60 (1977) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“It is dubious at best whether the requirement that a public 
officeholder own any assessable property within a parish is any more burdensome, or any 
less rational, than a requirement that he and his family live in that parish.”). 
 220. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text. 
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appointment to a local airport commission,221 and its 1989 decision in 
Quinn v. Millsap222 overturning a Missouri freeholder requirement for 
appointed office, hope for ownership requirements faded.  Although the 
Supreme Court again applied only rationality review in Quinn,223 and even 
though the Missouri office at issue had a limited scope, the Court’s broad 
announcement that a “demonstrated commitment to the[] community” was 
more important than ownership seemed to spell the death knell for property 
qualifications for public office.224 
Quinn makes clear that property ownership requirements for 
representatives are constitutionally questionable under the Equal Protection 
Clause.225  While not a perfect correlation, one might say that Quinn is to 
candidates what Kramer is to voters.  By reasonable extrapolation, one can 
also confidently say that property taxpayer requirements for candidates fail 
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.  Unlike with voters, however, 
the fallout of Bullock and Lubin also establishes that candidates can be 
charged for the privilege of participating in the political process.226  Equal 
Protection may demand absolute fiscal equality among voters, but it still 
tolerates financial obstacles in the paths of representatives. 
B. The Federal Qualifications Clauses 
Sections 2 and 3 of Article I define qualifications for federal 
representatives and senators, respectively.  Section 2 states:  “No Person 
shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty-
five Years, and been seven years a Citizen of the United States, and who 
shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be 
chosen.”227  Section 3 states:  “No Person shall be a Senator who shall not 
have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of 
the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that 
State for which he shall be chosen.”228  Section 1 of Article II, in turn, 
defines the qualifications of the President: 
                                                          
 221. Chappelle, 431 U.S. at 159. 
 222. 491 U.S. 95 (1989). 
 223. See id. at 107 n.10 (holding that because land-ownership requirements for all 
members of a board of freeholders could not survive Turner’s rationality basis scrutiny, it 
was not necessary to consider whether strict scrutiny applied). 
 224. See id. at 109 (observing that the board of freeholders had powers that affected 
everyone in the community, whether or not they owned land). 
 225. See id. (remarking that property ownership is an invalid requirement for election or 
appointment to any body with the power to change local government and to affect all 
citizens). 
 226. See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 718 (acknowledging fees as an effective 
means of managing the number of candidates on the ballot but requiring alternative methods 
of qualification). 
 227. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. 
 228. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3. 
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No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United 
States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible 
to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that 
Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and 
been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.229 
These provisions collectively set out the age, citizenship and residence 
requirements for federal elected office. 
In Powell v. McCormack,230 the Supreme Court ruled that Congress 
could not add qualifications to those established by Article I.  Rather, 
Article I’s age, residence, and citizenship requirements are fixed from the 
federal standpoint.231  In Powell, the federal House of Representatives 
sought to deny one of its 435 seats to Adam Clayton Powell, who had been 
duly elected from the 18th Congressional District of New York.232  Powell 
was suspected of making illegal salary payments to his wife and deceiving 
House authorities as to travel expenses during his incumbency.233  Rather 
than vote to expel Powell,234 the House voted to exclude him following his 
re-election235 under Article I, Section 5, clause 1, which delegates to “Each 
House” the power to “Judge the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of 
its own Members.”  While it conceded that Powell satisfied the age, 
residence, and citizenship qualifications found in Article I, the House 
membership concluded that his wrongdoing rendered him otherwise 
unqualified and justified his exclusion.236 
Powell challenged his exclusion in federal district court.  The 
defendants, who included the House leadership and its Sergeant at Arms, 
responded that whether Powell could be excluded presented a 
nonjusticiable, political question.237  In the course of answering this 
question, the Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Warren, concluded that 
                                                          
 229. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.  Of course, the President is not elected directly, but is 
elected by members of the Electoral College, who are themselves “appoint[ed], in such 
manner as the [state] Legislature[s] . . . may direct . . . .”  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.  The 
Constitution does not spell out the qualifications for the members of the Electoral College.  
Consequently, the presumption is that, for constitutional purposes, these electors are to be 
treated as any other state officeholder.  See U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 
861 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Even respondents do not dispute that the States may 
establish qualifications for their delegates to the electoral college, as long as those 
qualifications pass muster under other constitutional provisions (primarily the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments).”). 
 230. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
 231. See id. at 547 (holding that Congress’s power to exclude elected members must be 
construed narrowly to protect the right of the people to choose who governs them). 
 232. Id. at 489. 
 233. Id. at 489-90. 
 234. Expulsion is authorized by the Constitution, which states that “[e]ach House 
may . . . , with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 
2. 
 235. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. 
 236. Powell, 395 U.S. at 492-93. 
 237. Id. at 495. 
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Article I’s qualifications were fixed and could not be altered by the 
Congress.238  Given these fixed qualifications, Powell’s exclusion for other 
reasons239 presented a justiciable question that fell within the jurisdiction of 
Article III courts.240  Indeed, because the House’s action was inconsistent 
with the plain command of Article I, Powell’s exclusion was 
unconstitutional.241 
The Supreme Court’s conclusion that Congress cannot alter or 
supplement Article I’s age, residence, and citizenship requirements is not 
controversial today.  Indeed, Justice Stewart’s lone dissent in Powell was 
based on mootness as opposed to Article I’s scope,242 and the Court’s 
modern makeup has unanimously embraced Powell’s result.243  This is not 
to say that the modern Supreme Court agrees on why Congress is 
prohibited from changing Article I’s qualifications; to the contrary, the 
Court is closely divided over the reason.  But the Justices at least agree on 
an absence of federal power in this regard. 
The Court’s disagreement over Powell’s rationale was pushed to the 
forefront by Arkansas’s decision in 1992 to rotate its federal 
representatives.  By popular initiative, Arkansas amended its constitution to 
limit its representatives in the federal Senate and House to two and three 
terms, respectively.244  In U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton,245 a thin five-to-
four majority struck down Arkansas’ term limits under Article I and the 
authority of Powell.246  The majority, per Justice Stevens, found that 
                                                          
 238. Id. at 548. 
 239. The Court concluded that whether an elected official met the qualifications 
prescribed by Article I presented a nonjusticiable, political question.  Id. at 523.  Hence, 
Powell could have been excluded—without effective federal judicial review—for not 
meeting the age, residence and citizenship requirements of Article I.  See id. (“Petitioners 
concede—and we agree—that if Powell had not met one of the standing qualifications set 
forth in the Constitution, he could have been excluded under Article I, § 5.”).  The House, 
however, conceded that Powell met these qualifications.  Id. at 550.  Powell could also have 
been expelled under Article I by a two-third majority vote after being seated.  Id. at 507.  
Even though Powell was excluded by over a two-third’s majority, the Court concluded that 
his exclusion could not be equated with expulsion.  Id. at 511-12. 
 240. Id. at 549.  “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under the Constitution, the Laws of the United States . . . .”  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 241. Powell, 395 U.S. at 550. 
 242. See id. at 559 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that Powell’s subsequent election 
and seating mooted the controversy). 
 243. See U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 779 (1995) (holding that Powell 
also prevents states from changing or adding to Article I’s stated qualifications); id. at 875 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I agree with the majority that Congress has no power to prescribe 
qualifications for its own Members.”). 
 244. See id. at 784  (describing the state constitutional amendment’s limits on both state 
and federal elected officials).  Actually, Arkansas’ constitutional amendment was more 
technical.  It prevented those who had served three or more terms in the House or two or 
more terms in the Senate from being “certified as [] candidate[s]” and being “eligible to 
have [their] name[s] placed on the ballot[s] . . . .”  See id. (quoting ARK. CONST. amend. 73, 
§ 3).  This aspect of the case is discussed below. 
 245. 514 U.S. at 779. 
 246. See id. at 837 (concluding that qualifications for federal office could only come 
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Powell’s rationale applied equally to the states.247  The more conservative 
four-Justice dissent, in contrast, found that although Powell was right about 
a general lack of federal power, it was wrong to conclude that Article I’s 
qualifications were fixed and unalterable.248  And because they were not 
fixed, the dissent argued, Article I’s qualifications could be supplemented 
by the states. 
Powell relied almost exclusively on the Framers’ original understanding 
of what Article I’s Qualification Clause was meant to establish.  Prior to 
the Constitutional Convention of 1787, English precedent recognized both 
standing qualifications, which if not met could result in exclusion,249 and 
Parliament’s authority to expel members for misdeeds that would not 
justify exclusion.250  The Court focused on “the most notorious English 
election dispute of the 18th century:”251  the expulsion and subsequent 
exclusion by Parliament of John Wilkes.252   
While serving in the House of Commons in 1763, Wilkes “published an 
attack on a recent peace treaty with France.”253  Following his arrest, 
Wilkes was expelled from the House.254  After his exile and return to 
England, Wilkes was elected again in 1768,255 imprisoned, and elected 
again three times thereafter.  “[E]ach time the same Parliament declared 
him ineligible and refused to seat him.”256  Following Wilkes’s release, the 
House of Commons in 1782 voted to expunge his expulsions, resolving that 
“the prior House actions were ‘subversive of the rights of the whole body 
of electors of this kingdom.’”257 
With the successful resolution of Wilkes’ long and bitter struggle for the 
right of the British electorate to be represented by men of their own 
choice, it is evident that, on the eve of the Constitutional Convention, 
English precedent stood for the proposition that “the law of the land had 
                                                                                                                                      
through amendment of the federal Constitution). 
 247. See id. (emphasizing that the Framers of the Constitution intended qualifications to 
be uniform across all states). 
 248. See id. at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that since the Constitution was 
silent on whether states can add to the qualifications required of its representatives, that 
power is reserved by the states). 
 249. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 522-23 (1969) (observing that clergy in 
England were ineligible for election to the House of Commons and thus could be excluded). 
 250. See id. at 524-25 (describing several instances in which Parliament expelled 
members “for misdeeds not encompassed within recognized standing incapacities existing 
either at the time of the expulsions or at the time the Constitution was drafted in 1787”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 251. Id. at 527. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. at 528. 
 257. Id. 
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regulated the qualifications of members to serve in parliament” and those 
qualifications were “not occasional but fixed.”258 
The House of Commons’ expunction of Wilkes’s expulsions “repudiated 
any ‘control over the eligibility of candidates, except in the administration 
of the law which define their (standing) qualifications.’”259  “Wilkes’ 
struggle and his ultimate victory,” the Powell Court concluded, “had a 
significant impact in the American colonies.”260  “Colonials tended to 
identify their cause with that of Wilkes.  They saw him as a popular hero 
and a martyr to the struggle for liberty.”261 
Just five years removed from Wilkes’s struggle and success, the 
Convention set its hand to drafting qualifications for federal office.  The 
Framers, with little debate, agreed to the propriety of age requirements for 
both Houses,262 though it did not settle on anything specific.  It instead 
instructed its Committee of Detail to draft a document incorporating this 
suggestion,263 as well as George Mason’s proposed property 
qualification.264  The Committee reported back no change in the age 
requirement, but recommended adding citizenship and residency 
requirements for membership.265  The Convention thereafter unanimously 
adopted the three qualifications embodied in Art. I, Section 2.266 
Two days after adopting these qualifications, the Convention addressed 
the Committee’s recommendation that the Congress be given the power to 
“establish such uniform qualifications of the members of each House, with 
regard to property, as to the said Legislature shall seem expedient.”267  
James Madison, among others,268 responded that this was an “improper & 
dangerous power,”269 and that qualifications “ought to be fixed by the 
Constitution.”270  “Significantly, Madison’s argument was not aimed at the 
imposition of a property qualification as such, but rather at the delegation 
                                                          
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. at 529. 
 260. Id. at 530. 
 261. Id. at 531. 
 262. Id. at 532. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 533.  Mason had moved that a clause “‘requiring certain qualifications of 
landed property & citizenship’ and disqualifying from membership in Congress persons 
who had unsettled accounts or were indebted to the United States” be inserted.  Id. at 532 
(quoting 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 121 (M. Farrand ed., 1911)).  
The “disqualification of debtors and the limitation to ‘landed’ property” were eliminated and 
the Committee of Detail was instructed “to draft a property qualification.”  Id. at 533 (citing 
Farrand, supra, at 130-31). 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Benjamin Franklin objected that “some of the greatest rogues he was ever 
acquainted with, were the richest rogues.”  Id. at 534 n.64 (citation omitted). 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. 
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to the Congress of discretionary power to establish any qualifications.”271  
The Convention thereafter rejected the Committee’s proposal.  Later that 
same day, however, the Convention authorized each House to be the judge 
of its own members’ qualifications272 and imposed a super-majority 
requirement on expulsion.273  According to the Supreme Court in Powell, 
“the Convention’s decision to increase the vote required to expel, . . . while 
at the same time not similarly restricting the power to judge qualifications, 
is compelling evidence that they considered the latter already limited by the 
standing qualifications previously adopted.”274  The history and text 
surrounding Article I thus was found by the Powell Court to converge on a 
clear, if not obvious, holding:  “in judging the qualifications of its members 
Congress is limited to the standing qualifications prescribed in the 
Constitution.”275 
In hindsight, Powell was an easy case.  The Constitution did not 
specifically assign to Congress the power to define the qualifications of its 
elected members.  It did not even empower Congress to define the 
qualifications of voters.  Article I directed each House to judge the 
qualifications of its members, and provided each House a mechanism, a 
supermajority vote, to expel members for reasons unrelated to 
qualifications.  Even without the history described in Powell, it would seem 
difficult to allow Congress an added power to add qualifications by simple 
majority vote. 
States, unlike Congress, enjoy general powers under the U.S. 
Constitution.276  Article I, Section 2 additionally recognizes the states’ 
rights to define qualifications of voters in state and federal elections:  “the 
Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of 
                                                          
 271. Id. at 534. 
 272. Id. at 536. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id.  The Court further based its conclusion on the debates that surrounded the state 
ratifying conventions.  Hamilton, in particular, argued that the Constitution’s qualifications 
were fixed.  Id. at 540-41.  It also addressed Congressional practices following ratification, 
which the Court found to be “erratic.”  Id. at 544.  Congress was first confronted with the 
issue when the eligibility of William McCreery was challenged because he did not meet his 
home state of Maryland’s durational residence requirement.  Id. at 542.  The House 
Committee of Elections recommended that McCreery be seated, since “neither the State nor 
the Federal Legislatures are vested with authority to add to those qualifications, so as to 
change them.”  Id. at 543.  This remained the approach until 1868, when “the House voted 
for the first time in its history to exclude a member-elect.”  Id. at 544.  Noting the lack of 
any consistent Congressional pattern, the Court afforded this history little import.  See id. at 
546-47 (remarking that even if Congress had been consistent, a repeated unconstitutional 
practice would have little or no precedential value). 
 275. Id. at 550. 
 276. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people.”). 
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the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.”277  Section 3 provides 
that Senators “shall be . . . chosen by the Legislature[s of the States].”278  
As for President, Article II delegates to the state legislatures the power to 
“appoint . . . a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators 
and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the 
Congress . . . .”279  Article VI then limits state power by stating that “no 
religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or 
public Trust under the United States.”280 
Given the states’ general powers, the specific recognitions and 
delegations of electoral power found in Articles I and II, and the explicit 
rejection in Article VI of religious tests, a credible case can be made for 
state power to add non-religious qualifications to the age, residence, and 
citizenship requirements spelled out by Article I (and even Article II). 
The Supreme Court in Thornton relied heavily on the history recited in 
Powell to overcome these textual and structural distinctions.281  It also 
added to the historical record by pointing out that no court had ever 
sustained a state’s added qualifications, whether the addition was “in the 
form of term limits, district residency requirements, loyalty oath 
requirements, [or] restrictions on those convicted of felonies.”282  Early 
commentators of the likes of Joseph Story and Thomas Cooley, the Court 
found, were similarly unanimous.283  Moreover, the Court observed that 
following the ratification of the Constitution, few states attempted to extend 
additional qualifications demanded of local elected officials, like freeholder 
status, to their federal counterparts.  “Only one State, Virginia, placed 
similar [property] restrictions on Members of Congress, requiring that a 
                                                          
 277. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. 
 278. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.  This was changed by the Seventeenth Amendment, 
ratified in 1913, which now requires that Senators be “elected by the people [of each State] 
for six years; and . . . [t]he electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for 
electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.  
Whether judged by Article I or the Seventeenth Amendment, it is clear that the states define 
the qualifications of the Senate’s electors—be they members of the various state legislatures 
or the population at-large. 
 279. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.  The one proviso is that “no Senator or 
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall 
be appointed an Elector.”  Id. 
 280. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.  Article I’s Incompatibility Clause additionally prohibits 
any “Person holding any Office under the United States” from being “a Member of either 
House during his Continuance in Office.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. 
 281. 514 U.S. 779, 789-93 (1995) (recalling that the Framers feared that the ability of 
Congress to add qualifications for office could easily lead to abuses of power). 
 282. Id. at 798-99 (citations omitted).  The Court cited an impressive array of cases 
dating back to 1918 striking down these additional requirements.  Id. 
 283. Id. at 799-800 (citations omitted).  More recent commentators, the Court 
recognized, have offered divergent views on the authority of states to add term limits to 
congressional office.  See id. at 800 n.14 (providing examples of various writers’ views 
published in law review articles). 
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representative be, inter alia, a ‘freeholder.’”284  In contrast, “several States, 
including New Hampshire, Georgia, Delaware, and South Carolina, revised 
their Constitutions at around the time of the Federal Constitution,”285 and 
maintained property qualifications for local elected officials, “yet placed no 
property qualification on [their] congressional representatives.”286 
The contemporaneous practice surrounding rotation painted a similar 
portrait.  “At the time of the Convention, States widely supported term 
limits in at least some circumstances.  The Articles of Confederation 
contained a provision for term limits.”287  Notwithstanding “widespread 
support, no State sought to impose any term limits on its own federal 
representatives.”288 
It was true, as Justice Thomas pointed out in dissent, that several states 
extended district and durational residence requirements to their federal 
representatives.289  The latter requirement, however, could have been 
understood as merely an attempt at implementing Article I’s residence 
requirement.  No federal definition of Article I’s inhabitance 
requirements,290 after all, existed, and state laws could reasonably have 
been expected to fill this void without necessarily adding qualifications.  
Given that states commonly defined “citizenship” differently for national 
and local purposes,291 it was only natural that they would understand and 
define residence in different ways.  Durational residence, then, was likely 
not understood to be an additional qualification; rather, it was simply an 
explanation of Article I’s inhabitance requirements.292 
The not uncommon practice of requiring district residence is more 
troubling.  One might, as did the majority in Thornton, consider this 
requirement a “necessary analog”293 to the common (and permissible) use 
                                                          
 284. Id. at 823-24.  “Just 15 years after imposing a property qualification, Virginia 
replaced that requirement with a provision requiring that representatives be only ‘qualified 
according to the constitution of the United States.’”  Id. at 824. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 825. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at 826. 
 289. See id. at 905 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that at least three states that had 
adopted the district and durational residence requirements where representatives had to have 
lived in their districts for a minimum of one year, and in one state, three years).  
Additionally, several states also used “district-based selection processes” during the first 
three presidential elections.  See id. at 904 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that “2 of the 10 
States that participated in the first Presidential election in 1788, 3 of the 15 States that 
participated in 1792, and 5 of the 16 States that participated in 1796” used districts). 
 290. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. 
 291. See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 872-73 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Before the Constitution 
was adopted, citizenship was controlled entirely by state law, and the different States 
established different criteria . . . . Accordingly, the constitutional requirement that Members 
of Congress be United States citizens meant different things in different States.”). 
 292. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. 
 293. See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 826 n.41 (“States may simply have viewed district 
residency requirements as the necessary analog to state residency requirements.”).  Id.  It 
BROWN OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  2:42:19 PM 
2005] BALLOT FEES 1323 
of districts.294  Otherwise, a single candidate might be selected in several 
districts and ultimately hold title to more than one congressional seat.  This 
risk is easily solved by modern ballot laws, which restrict each candidate to 
a single seat.  But official ballots did not exist in early America.  It is thus 
understandable that five of the seven states that used districts also 
demanded district residence of their representatives. 295  The two states that 
did not require district residence296 might have either concluded that Article 
I blocked such a requirement,297 or felt that the risk of a candidate’s 
winning more than one seat was too remote to justify such an imposition.298 
 Regardless of the motivation, it would seem that a district residence 
requirement constituted just as much of an additional qualification in 1789 
as it does today.299  The fact that five states in 1789 imposed this additional 
requirement impeaches the majority’s claim that Article I’s qualifications 
were generally understood by the states to be fixed.300 
While I am not convinced that the majority in Thornton was fully 
correct301—that is, there is credible historical evidence to suggest that 
Article I was not generally understood to preclude all additional 
qualifications that might be imposed by the state—the Thornton majority 
was at least right about two commonly imposed qualifications:  rotation 
and property ownership.  Rather than looking at Article I as including 
                                                                                                                                      
would seem that a district residence requirement would be better understood as an analog to 
districting, rather than residence.  Duration is better understood as an analog to residence. 
 294. The Framers fully envisioned the use of districts to select representatives.  Id. at 905 
n.30 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Framers wanted to let States decide for themselves 
whether to use district elections in selecting Members of the House of Representatives.”). 
 295. These five states were Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and 
Virginia.  Id. at 905 n.31 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 296. These two states were New York and South Carolina.  Id. at 908 n.34 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 297. For example, many in the Massachusetts House of Representatives questioned the 
state’s power under the Constitution to add a district residence requirement.  Id. at 906 
(Thomas, J., dissenting).  Still, Massachusetts imposed a district residence requirement on 
its federal representatives.  Id. 
 298. I thus do not agree with Justice Thomas that “[i]f the States had considered district 
residency requirements necessary for the success of a district election system, but had 
agreed with the majority that the Constitution prohibited them from supplementing the 
constitutional list of qualifications, then they simply would have . . . used statewide 
elections.”  Id. at 909 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Instead, a state could have simply concluded 
that while district residence would have avoided certain problems, it was simply not worth it 
given the remoteness of any perceived difficulties. 
 299. The majority in Thornton, after all, pointed to district residence as one additional 
qualification that was properly struck down.  514 U.S. at 799.  District residence 
requirements for congressional office are thus invalid under Article I. 
 300. Thus, it would seem that Florida’s addition of a competency requirement, id. at 917 
(Thomas, J., dissenting), ought to not necessarily prove invalid.  Similarly, Illinois’ ban on 
prisoners serving in federal office, id., should not be rejected out-of-hand under Thornton.  
Nor should Georgia’s bar on certain convicted felons.  Id.  Last but not least, it may be that 
states—like Rhode Island—can properly limit congressional office to qualified voters.  Id. 
 301. Id. at 783 (concluding that “[a]llowing individual States to adopt their own 
qualifications for congressional service would be inconsistent with the Framers’ vision of a 
uniform National Legislature representing the people of the United States”). 
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maximal or minimal qualifications, Article I might better be viewed 
through the lenses of specific requirements.  Rotation was not uncommon 
in Revolutionary America—it was required by the Articles of 
Confederation302—yet  was unanimously rejected by the members of the 
Constitutional Convention.303  In light of the fact that rotation was 
considered by the Convention, unanimously rejected, and not imposed on 
federal representatives following ratification, it is logical to assume that the 
practice proved inconsistent with the contemporaneous understanding of 
Article I.  A qualification’s common application and consideration, coupled 
with its rejection and subsequent abandonment, offer strong support for 
preclusion under Article I.304 
Although not as convincing, the same would seem true of property 
ownership.  Property qualifications were generally applied to 
representatives throughout the states.305  Property qualifications were also 
considered by the delegates at the Constitutional Convention; specifically, 
the Framers discussed whether to authorize Congress to “establish such 
uniform qualifications of the members of each House, with regard to 
property, as [Congress] shall seem expedient.”306  The Convention’s 
express rejection of this power307 clearly disabled the Congress.  When 
coupled with the states’ near-total abandonment of the idea for federal 
office following ratification,308 one sees evidence of a general rejection of 
property qualifications for congressional office in post-Convention 
America. 
For similar reasons, it would appear reasonably clear that states cannot 
demand property ownership of presidential candidates.309  This is not 
because Article II’s qualifications are fixed; rather, it flows from the 
                                                          
 302. See id. at 825 (noting that the Articles of Confederation contained a provision 
indicating term limits). 
 303. Id. at 812 n.22. 
 304. Another common state qualification, religion, was considered and expressly 
rejected by the text of Article VI.  See id. at 825 n.35.  I recognize that Article VI cuts 
against my argument.  But the force of using express terms to preclude religious 
qualifications is not so powerful that it prevents implying any additional preclusions. 
 305. See id. at 807 n.18 (noting that a majority of states at the time of the founding had 
property qualifications for their representatives).  See also supra notes 54-58 and 
accompanying text (describing property qualifications of founding generation). 
 306. 514 U.S. at 885 n.18 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Farrand, supra note 264, at 
248-51). 
 307. Id. 
 308. Only Virginia imposed a property qualification, and this was repealed fifteen years 
later.  Id. at 823 n.33.  Courts thus had no opportunity to pass on the constitutionality of 
property qualifications for federal office.  Id. 
 309. The matter of rotation for federal executive office has since been solved, for the 
most part, by the Twenty-second Amendment, which states that “[n]o person shall be 
elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no person who has held the office 
of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some other 
person was elected President shall be elected to the office of President more than once.”  
U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1. 
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Convention’s rejection of property qualifications and the states’ apparent 
post-ratification acquiescence.310  Contrary to the dissent’s concession in 
Thornton that states have “no reserved power to establish qualifications for 
the office of President,”311 it would not seem illogical to allow a state the 
luxury of adding qualifications to those prescribed by Article II.  Article II, 
after all, delegates to the states the power to select their representatives in 
the Electoral College,312 and requires these electors to vote for at least one 
person who is “not . . . an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves.”313  
This not only suggests that the Framers envisioned additional 
qualifications, like state residence, for presidential candidates, it also 
demonstrates that the Framers knew how to combat added presidential 
qualifications when they saw fit.  While this does not mean that states are 
free to stack additional qualifications on presidential candidates, it suggests 
that added requirements cannot be dismissed out-of-hand. 
Still, the Convention’s rejection of property ownership for members of 
Congress, its meticulous creation of the presidential nominating system 
known today as the Electoral College, its guarantee of a fixed executive 
salary without state interference,314 and the uniform failure of states to 
demand property ownership on the part of presidential candidates, solidly 
support the conclusion that States cannot impose property qualifications on 
presidential candidates. 
Regardless of whether the Thornton Court was correct about the age, 
residence, and citizenship requirements outlined in Articles I and II, the 
Equal Protection analysis found in Turner and Quinn would appear to 
                                                          
 310. See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 803-04 (“States . . . ‘have just as much right, and no 
more, to prescribe new qualifications for a representative, as they have for a president . . . . 
It is no original prerogative of state power to appoint a . . . president for the union.’”) 
(second alteration in original) (quoting 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES § 627 (3d ed. 1858)). 
 311. Id. at 861 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 312. The dissent correctly observed that states can “set qualifications for their 
Presidential electors,” a point the “respondents d[id] not dispute.”  Id. at 861 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).  Other than Article II’s requirement that the electors not hold a federal office, 
see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2, limitations on this power are located in the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  Thornton, 514 U.S. at 861 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 313. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. 
 314. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 (“The President shall, at stated Times, receive for 
his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the 
Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any 
other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.”). The Court in Thornton utilized 
the Congressional Salary Clause of Article I to support its conclusion that states could not 
impose additional qualifications on representatives.  See 514 U.S. at 804 (arguing that the 
Salary Clause also supports the Court’s “view of the Framers’ vision” because it proves that 
“representatives owe their allegiance to the people, and not to the States”).  Because, similar 
to Article I’s Salary Clause, Article II’s Salary Clause is fixed and unalterable by the States, 
it would appear the same is true in terms of the President.  Moreover, because Article II 
expressly prohibits a State from giving the President more, it would seem equally clear that 
a State could not require that he take less. 
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render property ownership constitutionally immaterial to one’s capacity to 
serve in elected office.315  States today, unlike the founding generation, 
cannot demand that candidates for state offices routinely own real estate or 
personal assets.  Nor can states limit elected office to taxpayers—whether 
the taxable res is real or personal.  Simply put, ownership and taxation 
requirements are constitutionally suspect under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. 
Because the Court’s Equal Protection precedent does not upset the basic 
ballot fee concept, however, Thornton’s analysis of Article I’s 
Qualifications Clauses remains relevant to concerns over economic barriers 
to federal office.  The question is whether state-imposed ballot fees for 
federal office prove consistent with the letter and spirit of Articles I and II. 
IV. BALLOT FEES AS QUALIFICATIONS 
For some, treating ballot fees as property qualifications is 
constitutionally and historically counterintuitive.  Filing fees, after all, have 
been around for the better part of a century and have regularly been upheld 
in the federal courts, including the Supreme Court.  Why now discover that 
they constitute impermissible qualifications? 
There are several responses.  First, the argument that ballot fees 
constitute impermissible property qualifications is not novel and has not 
been uniformly rejected.  At least one state supreme court ruled that ballot 
fees constituted unconstitutional property qualifications for state elective 
office in the first quarter of the twentieth century.316  Several other states 
saw their ballot fees suffer similar fates at the hands of state courts for 
related reasons.317 
Second, unlike their state-law counterparts, which were litigated a 
century ago, the restrictions placed on state ballot laws by the federal  
Qualifications Clauses were only recently thrust to the forefront by 
Thornton.  Before Thornton in 1995, it was uncertain whether states were 
barred from adding qualifications to those spelled out in Articles I and II.318  
Granted, the Supreme Court invalidated ownership qualifications for 
elective office under the Equal Protection Clause in 1970.319  But the 
Court’s cautious approach in this field, coupled with its ballot fee 
precedents, left the Equal Protection Clause’s reach uncertain.  Even if 
states were precluded from adding qualifications, it appeared clear before 
Thornton was decided in 1995 that states could still use fees to regulate 
                                                          
 315. See supra notes 213-225 and accompanying text. 
 316. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 317. See supra notes 135-139 and accompanying text. 
 318. 514 U.S. at 799 (declaring unconstitutional an Arkansas law placing term limits on 
congressional office). 
 319. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970). 
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ballots. 
Third, the Qualifications Clauses bring the founding generation’s 
original understanding to bear on the validity of ballot fees.  It is one thing 
to argue that ballot fees, which were not uncommon in the last quarter of 
the nineteenth century,320 survive scrutiny under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Post-bellum America, after all, understood that paper ballots 
would be used and fees would be charged, if not by government then by the 
parties that printed the ballots.321  It is another thing to argue that ballot fees 
survive the Framers’ original understanding of candidates’ qualifications.  
Fees for ballots and offices were unheard of in 1787.322  Indeed, the 
Framers rejected the thought of states demanding property ownership of 
their federal representatives.323  Further, they guaranteed that federal 
representatives’ salaries would be set by the federal government in order to 
minimize local control over the electoral pool.324  Combined, these realities 
suggest that state-imposed office fees would surely have ruffled the 
egalitarian, anti-elitist feathers of many of the Framers. 
Of course, I am not so bold to suggest the argument is easy.  Original 
intent, as all serious constitutional scholars know, can be elusive.  Because 
the Convention kept no official transcript, the search for original intent 
always raises evidentiary concerns. Additionally, there is the problem of 
determining whose intent:  those who drafted the document, those who 
ratified it, or those who were bound by it.  Still, consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s practice, I think that one can tease some basic guidelines 
from the text of the Constitution, the Convention’s debates, and the 
practices accepted and followed by those who ratified and lived by the 
nation’s founding document. 
A. Fees as Property 
Electoral fees today are not office fees, as such, but are ballot fees.  The 
Third Circuit in Biener v. Calio325 made much of this fact in sustaining 
Delaware’s $3,000 filing fee for the Democratic House primary.326  But 
what if electoral fees were not tied to ballot access?  What if they were 
                                                          
 320. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (noting that political parties printed 
ballots and often demanded fees from candidates). 
 321. See id.  
 322. See supra notes 96-111 and accompanying text (describing the adoption of fees by 
states in the early twentieth century). 
 323. See supra notes 262-275 and accompanying text. 
 324. See infra note 329 and accompanying text. 
 325. 361 F.3d 206, 209 (3d Cir. 2004) (sustaining Delaware’s filing fee for congressional 
office despite challenge as an impermissible qualification under Article I’s Qualifications 
Clause, as well under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses). 
 326. See id. at 212 (observing that Delaware’s filing fee was designed “to keep 
Delaware’s ballots manageable” not “to evade the constitution and exclude a class” from 
office). 
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simply incidents of holding office?  Would they be no less valid?  
Consider, for example, a state that simply directs all elected federal 
officials to pay over a percentage of their salaries as a condition of holding 
office.  Would this fee be considered an impermissible qualification? 
Justifying election fees that are not tied to a state’s ballot machinery 
would seem difficult if not impossible.  Even putting aside the problem of 
intergovernmental tax immunities,327 which the founding generation (if one 
believes John Marshall) embraced,328 a state’s extraction of personal 
property from its federal elected officials would certainly have proved 
problematic to the Founding Fathers.  The same Framers who rejected 
property ownership as a condition of office, and who directed that elected 
federal officials receive a fixed salary set and paid by the federal 
government,329 would not likely have looked fondly on a state’s reducing 
this salary by way of direct extraction. 
Of course, not a word about office fees was uttered at the Constitutional 
Convention.  Although poll taxes for voters were known to the founding 
generation, no state imposed fees on those elected to office.330  Indeed, 
                                                          
 327. This doctrine prohibited one sovereignty from taxing another.  The Supreme Court 
in McColluch v. Maryland, applied this doctrine to strike down a Maryland tax levied on the 
Second Bank of the United States.  17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).  Prior to the Court’s 
philosophical uprising in 1937, it frequently relied on this doctrine to invalidate both state 
taxes placed on salaries of federal officials, see Dobbins v. Commissioner, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 
435, 450 (1842), and federal taxes placed on the salaries of state officials, see Collector v. 
Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 128 (1871).  Today, state taxes placed on the salaries of federal 
officials, including judges protected by Article III, are valid so long as they do not 
discriminate in favor of state offices.  See generally Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 
423 (1999) (upholding a county occupation tax levied against federal judges). 
 328. See McColluch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 437 (holding that states cannot 
constitutionally tax  federal institutions). 
 329. The President is guaranteed “Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor 
diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected.”  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, 
cl. 7.  Though not expressly protected from diminution, Senators and Representatives were 
also guaranteed “Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of 
the Treasury of the United States.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.  The Thornton Court used the 
latter provision to bolster its conclusion that the qualifications in Article I are exclusively for 
members of Congress.  “Madison argued that, congressional compensation should be fixed 
in the Constitution [to avoid representatives’] ‘improper dependence’ [on the states].”  U.S. 
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 809 (1995) (citing Farrand, supra note 264, at 
216).  “George Mason [concurred], noting that ‘the parsimony of the States might reduce the 
provision so low that . . . the question would not be who were most fit to be chosen, but who 
were most willing to serve.’”  Id. at 809-10 (citing Farrand, supra note 264, at 216).  
Nathaniel Gorham also agreed, observing that “the State Legislatures . . . were always 
paring down salaries in such a manner as to keep out of offices men most capable of 
executing the functions of them.”  Id. at 810 (citing Farrand, supra note 264, at 372).  
Edmund Randolph further concluded that allowing the states to set salaries would lead to 
“dependence . . . that would vitiate the whole System.”  Id. (citing Farrand, supra note 264, 
at 372).  Hence, the Thornton majority concluded that “[i]n light of the Framers’ evident 
concern that States would try to undermine the National Government, they could not have 
intended States to have the power to set qualifications.”  Id.  A system that directed federal 
salaries to be set by the federal government would naturally resist direct salary reductions by 
way of office fees at the hands of the states. 
 330. The Framers were familiar with poll taxes placed on voters.  See supra note 47 and 
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because election at this juncture in American history was considered more 
a duty than a luxury, the Framers likely would have frowned upon state 
laws that were designed to deter otherwise-qualified candidates.  George 
Mason, for example, complained that allowing states to set federal salaries 
“might reduce the provision so low that . . . the question would be not who 
were most fit to be chosen, but who were most willing to serve.”331  He 
thus championed delegating to Congress the power to set representatives’ 
salaries.  This sentiment strongly suggests that a state’s attempt to reduce 
its representatives’ salaries by way of fees or other extractions would have 
run into stiff opposition at the Constitutional Convention. 
Perhaps more importantly, the Framers’ principal reason for rejecting 
ownership as an Article I qualification was their aversion to elitism and 
wealth, at least in regard to the House of Representatives.  According to 
Thornton, the Framers rejected property ownership because it threatened to 
close government to the common man.332  Madison wrote in his Federalist 
Papers that “the door of [the House of Representatives] is open to merit of 
every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and 
without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession of 
religious faith.”333  This same reasoning would seem to foreclose a 
requirement that elected officials pay over property as a condition of 
holding office.  Ownership was rejected because it precluded a significant 
segment of the community from running for office.  In order to further this 
egalitarian goal, at least in terms of the House, the Framers went so far as 
to trade the financial independence demanded of voters334 for economic 
equality among representatives.  The same egalitarian philosophy that 
barred property ownership requirements applies to property extractions.  
                                                                                                                                      
accompanying text.  However, they would not have been familiar with any form of tax 
charged to candidates. 
 331. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 809-10 (citing Farrand, supra note 264, at 216). 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. at 807 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison)) (emphasis added). 
 334. Property qualifications were designed, in part, to insure the independence of  voters 
and representatives.  Robert G. Natelson, A Reminder:  The Constitutional Values of 
Sympathy and Independence, 91 KY. L.J. 353, 386-90 (2003).  Before adoption of the secret 
ballot, a credible fear existed that tenants would be forced to vote in their landlord’s interest.  
Consequently, the more property one owned, the more tenants he would have, and the more 
votes he could produce.  Property qualifications were thought to solve this problem by 
disenfranchising tenants and denying landlords multiple votes.  The Framers’ concern over 
equality, however, apparently trumped their concern over representatives’ independence.  
See id. at 389. 
When the question arose as to whether the Constitution should require officials to 
meet a property qualification so as to assure their personal independence, 
[Gouverneur] Morris responded that, ‘If qualifications are proper, he [would] prefer 
them in the electors rather than the elected.’  [James] Madison agreed, and most 
others would have, also.  Even so, there was strong support for property 
requirements for elected officials as well as voters. 
Id.  (footnotes omitted). 
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Extraction, after all, presupposes some measure of ownership. 
Some counter this last point by arguing that “a filing fee . . . may be paid 
by anyone in [the candidate’s] behalf.”335  Fees are thus unlike property 
qualifications, or qualifications of any sort.  In the words of the Third 
Circuit, filing fees are “not inherent in the candidate.”336  Age, residence, 
and citizenship, after all, must be satisfied by the candidate for office, as 
opposed to someone else.337   
At the time of the founding, property qualifications commonly 
demanded ownership that was unrelated to the political purpose to which 
the property was put.  Voters and candidates could not be gifted property 
simply to facilitate their participation in the electoral arena.  Some of the 
founding states went so far as to require that voters swear their qualifying 
property was not conveyed to them solely to extend the franchise.338  One 
might thus say that ownership in many states was required to be “inherent.”  
The reason for this restriction was not so much elitist as it was 
egalitarian.  A principal justification for imposing ownership requirements 
on electors was the principle of “one man, one vote.”  Without the demand 
of ownership, and because secrecy was impossible without official ballots, 
landlords could effectively cast the votes of their financially dependent 
tenants.  This risk was avoided by insuring financial independence on 
behalf of voters.  Lest landlords skirt this demand by fraudulently gifting or 
loaning property to tenants, “true” ownership was almost a necessity. 
Because of today’s secret ballots, of course, property qualifications are 
not needed to reduce the risk of landlords, or anyone else, casting multiple 
ballots by controlling others’ votes.  One might even wonder whether 
secret ballots would have led states to reject ownership demands altogether 
at the time of the founding.   
Speculation over this matter, however, is unnecessary for the simple 
reason the Constitutional Convention rejected property ownership of any 
sort as a condition of holding federal office.  The Framers’ rejection of the 
elitist tendencies of property qualifications admitted no exceptions for 
                                                          
 335. See Fowler v. Adams, 315 F. Supp. 592, 594 (M.D. Fla. 1970) (noting that a 
reasonable filing fee for federal office is constitutional because it “is not personal to the 
candidate” and thus does not constitute an improper qualification). 
 336. See Biener v. Calio, 361 F.3d 206, 212 (3d Cir. 2004) (distinguishing filing fees 
from “impermissible” additional qualifications). 
 337. See Fowler, 315 F. Supp. at 594 (“The qualifications set forth in Article I, Section 
2, Clause 2, must be possessed by the candidate, that is they are personal to him.”). 
 338. BISHOP, supra note 15, at 85. 
A great deal of fraud was perpetrated by means of conveyances made in order to 
qualify electors, in order that they might vote for some particular person [and thus] 
oaths taken by electors frequently contained a clause declaring that the estate by 
which the voter was qualified had not been conveyed for this purpose. 
Id.  Electors and candidates in some colonies and states at the time of the founding thus 
could not borrow real estate, or even accept it as a gift, in order to participate in the electoral 
arena. 
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ownership requirements that would have allowed gifts and loans for 
purposes of qualifying candidates.  Rather, the Framers’ interest in equality 
caused them to reject property requirements outright.339 Property 
ownership, however defined, cannot be required of federal representatives. 
  The Framers’ rejection of any distinction between “true” and 
“borrowed” property drains the Biener court’s observation of any real 
significance.  The most that can be made from the Biener court’s 
observation is that property differs from age, citizenship, and residence.340  
This rather unremarkable proposition, however, proves little.  Unlike age, 
residence, and citizenship, property has since the founding been subject to 
exchange and alienation.  Property laws may recognize different shades of 
ownership, but not even long-owned fee simple estates are “inherent” in the 
same way as age, residence, and citizenship.   
That modern candidates can solicit contributions and borrow money to 
pay fees is likewise irrelevant to the constitutional debate.  A filing fee is a 
filing fee regardless of whether paid from contributions, loans, or personal 
savings.  The same is true of taxes and debts of all sorts.341  Financial 
obligations remain financial obligations regardless of the debtor’s sources.  
Debate over the “inherent” nature of fees is a straw man.  It leads nowhere 
in the constitutional scheme of things. 
This is accepted wisdom in the context of voting rights.  As both dissents 
in the seminal voting rights case of Harper v. Virginia342 make clear, poll 
taxes are the historical and functional equivalents of property 
qualifications.343  Although property qualifications were preferred at the 
time of the founding, poll taxes were sometimes substituted to expand 
                                                          
 339. See supra notes 262-266 and accompanying text (explaining how the Founders 
decided on the qualifications in Article I, § 2, cl. 2). 
 340. See Biener, 361 F.3d at 212 (arguing that filing fees differ from “impermissible 
qualifications” because they are “not inherent in the candidate”). 
 341. Consider a hypothetical law student’s rationalization of why he did not disclose his 
many unpaid loans to the state’s Board of Bar Examiners:  “The loans are not really my 
debts—inherent in me—because anyone can pay them on my behalf.”  One suspects the 
Bar’s response would sound something like this:  “They are still your debts.  Whether and 
how they are paid is your concern.  But they remain your debts as far as your creditors are 
concerned.  And the Bar is concerned about your lack of candor.”  A lawful debt, of course, 
is not transformed into an unlawful debt or annihilated because a debtor may cajole another 
to pay it.  For this same reason, a fee is not rendered less a fee because the money used to 
satisfy its terms may be borrowed, gifted, stolen, or raised through campaign contributions.  
It is still a debt owed by the candidate.   
 342. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).  
 343. Id. at 674-75 (Black, J., dissenting). 
[W]hatever may be our personal opinion, history is on the side of ‘rationality’ of 
the State’s poll tax policy.  Property qualifications existed in the Colonies and were 
continued by many States after the Constitution was adopted.  Although I join the 
Court in disliking the policy of the poll tax, this is not in my judgment a justifiable 
reason for holding this poll tax law unconstitutional. 
Id.; see also id. at 684 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Property qualifications and poll taxes have 
been a traditional part of our political structure.”). 
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voting rights; one who did not own property could pay a tax instead.344  
Poll taxes were thus understood to serve as a proxy for the purposes that 
undergirded ownership requirements.345  In the context of voting rights, the 
fates of property qualifications and poll taxes have long been understood to 
fall together.346  One cannot be distinguished from the other.347 
Of particular relevance here, modern laws of gifts, debts and campaign 
contributions do not render poll taxes, which are nothing less than fees for 
voting, anything less than impermissible property qualifications.  It does 
not matter that the money used to pay a poll tax can be borrowed, gifted, 
stolen, or raised through contributions.  Poll taxes are invalid regardless of 
whether state laws authorize gifts and loans, or allow others to pay the tax. 
For similar reasons, allowing successful candidates to borrow, beg, or 
steal a state’s required office fee would not render it anything less than 
what it is:  a command that property be paid over to the government.  How 
the fee might be raised is irrelevant to its nature and validity.  Because 
office fees require that officeholders somehow come into money, they are 
as much a subset of property ownership as any poll tax, property tax, 
income tax, or user fee.  Their extraction is no less of an interference with 
property rights than any other tax or fee.348 
                                                          
 344. See supra note 47. 
 345. As explained by Justice Harlan in Harper, poll taxes and property qualifications 
shared a common philosophy: 
[I]t was probably accepted as sound political theory by a large percentage of 
Americans through most of our history, that people with some property have a 
deeper stake in community affairs, and are consequently more responsible, more 
educated, more knowledgeable, more worthy of confidence, than those without 
means, and that the community and Nation would be better managed if the 
franchise were restricted to such citizens. 
383 U.S. at 685 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 346. See Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 229-31 (1996) (plurality) 
(holding that a delegate fee for party’s convention arguably constituted an impermissible 
poll tax within meaning of federal voting rights laws). 
 347. The voting rights cases, of course, turned on the meaning of the Equal Protection 
Clause rather than the Qualifications Clauses of Articles I and II.  See, e.g., Harper, 383 
U.S. at 670 (indicating that wealth and fees bear no relation to one’s capacity to vote under 
the Equal Protection Clause).  Still, what is important is the historic and functional 
commonality between property qualifications and poll taxes.  Because of their origins and 
purposes, it doesn’t make sense to distinguish one from the other.  The same is necessarily 
true of fees and ownership requirements for federal office.  In the absence of convincing 
argument to the contrary, their fates ought to be joined under Articles I and II. 
 348. The Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural due process requirements attach to the 
extraction of taxes and fees.  See, e.g., McKesson Corp. v. Dep’t of Bus. Regulation, 496 
U.S. 18, 18-19 (1990) (ruling that, under the Due Process Clause, Florida must provide 
relief for taxes paid prior to an examination of their “validity”).  Hence, the government 
cannot claim that, because someone else might volunteer to pay them, a person’s taxes and 
fees do not constitute deprivations for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause. 
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B. The Problem of Size 
My assumption to this point has been that all extractions of property 
from federal office holders—as conditions of holding office—are 
impermissible.  It may be, however, that the problem does not admit a 
single answer.  Some fees might constitute property qualifications, while 
others might not.  In particular, large fees may be more easily equated with 
ownership requirements than trivial ones.  Consider, for example, a 
$100,000 fee imposed for the privilege of holding congressional office.  
Because only the wealthiest Americans can afford such a fee, most 
reasonable people would view it as the equivalent of a property 
qualification.  In contrast, a 1¢ fee bears fewer of the hallmarks of out-and-
out property requirements.  Perhaps only the former fails scrutiny under the 
Qualifications Clauses.  Extrapolating from this, perhaps only large fees 
cause qualifications problems. 
Constitutional distinctions based on a fee’s size have historical support.  
In striking down the filing fees that emerged at the beginning of the 
twentieth century as unconstitutional property qualifications, for example, 
one state court complained about the fee’s “enormous” size.349  Because the 
fee invalidated in that case (two percent of the annual salary for the 
office)350 was hefty by anyone’s standards, it is not clear if a more 
reasonable, or perhaps trivial, fee would have suffered the same fate.351 
The problem with this approach lies not at the extremes, but at the 
margins.  What about a $100 fee?  Or a $1,000 fee?  Historically, courts 
have resolved this sort of problem by turning to the age-old doctrine of 
“reasonableness.”  While I confess this approach is plausible in the context 
of qualifications for federal office, its many uncertainties lead me to 
question its usefulness.  “Reasonableness” under the Equal Protection 
Clause, remember, has resulted in courts sustaining huge ballot fees.352  A 
size-based approach risks not only duplicating this result, but also promises 
what amounts to “a patchwork of state qualifications, undermining the 
                                                          
 349. See, e.g., Johnson v. Grand Forks County, 113 N.W. 1071, 1075-76 (N.D. 1907) 
(striking down North Dakota’s newly imposed filing fee for primary elections).  The court 
stated: 
The charges . . . make the pecuniary ability of the person to pay the same a test as 
to his qualification to become a candidate for party nomination.  The law is as 
objectionable as if the test was based on a property qualification or the amount the 
elector had contributed to the public revenues. 
Id. 
 350. Id. at 1075. 
 351. For example, the court noted that it was “not . . . required . . . to pass upon the 
question of the power of the Legislature to require those submitting their names to be voted 
for at a primary to pay the expenses of the election.”  Id. 
 352. See, e.g., Green v. Mortham, 155 F.3d 1332, 1339 (11th Cir. 1998) (sustaining 
Florida’s congressional primary ballot fee of seven and a half percent of Congressional 
salary). 
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uniformity and the national character that the Framers envisioned and 
sought to ensure”—just what the Framers sought to avoid according to the 
Court in Thornton.353 
Putting predictions and practicalities aside, a more fundamental 
objection to a size-based standard rises from the history that surrounded the 
founding.  Ownership requirements at the time of the founding varied 
widely across the states.  South Carolina in 1778, for example, required that 
members of its state house own real estate valued at no less than £3,500.354  
New Hampshire, in contrast, demanded combined estates of personalty and 
realty worth only £100.355  Delaware and Virginia simply required 
freeholds, regardless of value.356  Pennsylvania only required that its state 
representatives be taxpayers, without identifying the amount of the tax or 
the value of the taxed property.357  No mention was made of these differing 
property standards at the Constitutional Convention.  Instead, property 
ownership was rejected as a whole. 
Constitutional theory likewise makes a size-based approach difficult.  
Unlike the Equal Protection Clause’s analytical continuum, which often 
weighs state and individual interests,358 the Constitution’s structural 
provisions rarely tolerate balancing.359  Because the Qualifications Clauses 
                                                          
 353. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 822 (1995) (discussing the 
Framers’ vision of the federal government as a “uniform national body representing the 
interests of a single people”). 
 354. THORPE, supra note 47, at 70. 
 355. Id. at 68. 
 356. Id. at 70. 
 357. Id. at 69-70. 
 358. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 451-52 (1985) 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s equal protection decisions 
“reflect a continuum of judgmental responses to differing classifications,” not “sharply 
defined classifications”). 
 359. The federal government’s compelling interest, for example, does not ordinarily 
justify the invasion of states’ rights.  See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932-33 
(1997) (rejecting “balancing” approach in context of a federal invasion of “separate state 
sovereignty”).  Nor does balancing justify violations of separation of power.  See, e.g., 
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (refusing to balance interests and uphold the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act).  Similarly, a compelling state 
interest does not trump the federal government’s exercise of its reserved powers.  See, e.g., 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (stating that, under the Supremacy Clause, 
Congress may “override” the balance between state and federal interests if it is acting within 
its constitutional power and if Congress clearly states its preemptive intent).  As one federal 
appellate court explained, 
no matter how great the state interest, we should not strain to create ambiguity in a 
statute where none exists.  Accordingly, we ask a single question, is the statute’s 
meaning plain?  If so, that ends our analysis, with the result that it must be held that 
Congress has preempted state law. 
Mo. Mun. League v. FCC, 299 F.3d 949, 953 (8th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).  See 
generally 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 140-41 (3d ed. 2000).  
Tribe explained: 
[F]or example, the role of the Appointments Clause . . . shows how constitutional 
text may at times properly be deemed decisive.  A pragmatic ‘balancing’ approach 
is surely inappropriate ‘where the Constitution by explicit text commits the power 
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are more structural than personal, they too appear to tolerate little (if any) 
balancing.360  Along these lines, the less-forgiving demands of structural 
limitations rarely allow incremental encroachments on the Constitution’s 
handiwork.361  Lower courts, for example, have struck down durational 
residence requirements for federal candidates under Article I362 that would 
clearly have survived analysis under the Equal Protection Clause.363 
The same goes for rotation.  The Thornton Court was obviously not 
impressed by the fact that Arkansas allowed some incumbents to run again 
(unencumbered) for federal office.364  Only those who had served three 
terms in the House, or two terms in the Senate, were excluded from the 
ballot.365  This restriction on only some incumbents was still found to 
contradict Article I.366  Length of service was simply irrelevant.  Whether 
Arkansas precluded all incumbents from running again, or only those who 
had served multiple terms, its system of rotation violated Article I.367  Size, 
one might say, is immaterial. 
Although there is apparently no precedent on the point, one might 
venture to guess that states’ incremental reductions in qualifications for 
federal office also violate Articles I and II.  A state law authorizing persons 
who will almost be twenty-five-years-old at the time the oath of office is 
administered, for example, is likely just as unconstitutional as one 
authorizing newborns to run for federal office.  The same likely goes for a 
state law that authorizes aliens who are almost citizens to hold federal 
                                                                                                                                      
at issue to the exclusive control’ of a given branch; in such circumstances the Court 
has ‘refused to tolerate any intrusion’ by the other branches. 
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Pub. Citizen v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 
484-85, 487 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring)) (footnotes omitted).  Thus, the balancing that 
occurs under the Equal Protection Clause is not often applied to the structural rights created 
under Articles I, II and III. 
 360. See Schaefer v. Townsend, 215 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The [Thornton] 
Court rejected . . . a broad reading of the Elections Clause and held the balancing test 
inapplicable where the challenged provision supplemented the Qualifications Clause.”). 
 361. By way of comparison, the Supreme Court has invalidated one-year durational 
residence requirements for voting, see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333 (1972), but 
sustained a fifty-day durational residence requirement, see Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 
682 (1973). 
 362. See, e.g., Schaefer, 215 F.3d at 1039 (striking down California’s requirement that a 
candidate for the House of Representatives be a state resident when filing nomination 
papers); Hellmann v. Collier, 141 A.2d 908, 912 (Md. 1958) (invalidating a Maryland 
requirement that candidates for the House of Representatives reside in their districts). 
 363. See, e.g., Marston, 410 U.S. at 684-85 (reversing the lower court, which relied on 
Equal Protection to invalidate a fifty-day durational residence requirement for voting). 
 364. 514 U.S. 779, 784 (1995). 
 365. Id.  Those who had served less were not barred from the ballot.  One might say that 
Arkansas’s version of term limits was not maximal or complete. 
 366. See id. at 787. 
 367. Those who fall under an exception may lack standing to challenge the qualification, 
but those who are precluded from running for office by the requirement have standing to 
challenge it.  See generally Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) 
(observing that for a plaintiff to have standing, he or she must experience an injury caused 
by defendant’s conduct which is addressable). 
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elected office.  States cannot incrementally dilute the qualifications found 
in Articles I and II by authorizing the candidacies of those who are quasi-
qualified.  “Close enough” may satisfy the Equal Protection Clause, but it 
will likely not suffice for the structural purposes of Articles I and II. 
The better argument then is that because states cannot incrementally 
subtract from or supplement the qualifications specified under Articles I 
and II, they cannot start down the path of adding ownership requirements 
and fees, either.  If ownership is a qualification, it is not rendered less so 
because the property’s value is small or trivial.  Demanding a little 
property, like demanding a bit more residence, still violates Articles I and 
II.  Unless one is willing to say that reasonable durational residence 
requirements are consistent with Articles I and II, reasonable property 
demands must also be deemed invalid.  And because fees are nothing more 
or less than ownership requirements, they too are invalid.  Like quasi-
rotation, quasi-citizenship, and quasi-residence qualifications, quasi-
property qualifications violate Articles I and II.368 
C. Comparing Ballot Fees 
If fees attached to offices constitute property qualifications, pure and 
simple, then they are obviously impermissible under Thornton.  The 
majority in Thornton makes clear that states cannot, consistent with 
Articles I and II, add qualifications of any sort to those already spelled out 
for congressional and presidential office.369  Even before Thornton, lower 
courts had struck down district residence requirements,370 loyalty oath 
requirements,371 and the exclusion of convicted felons.372  Lower courts 
following Thornton have invalidated stringent residence requirements373 as 
                                                          
 368. Lest one fear that invalidating all fees might wreck the electoral system, consider 
that the Supreme Court’s invalidation of all poll taxes and all property requirements for 
voting did not cause any electoral collapse.  About one-third of the states today, moreover, 
survive without charging candidates or officers filing fees.  See supra notes 153-154 and 
accompanying text. 
 369. 514 U.S. at 827 (concluding that states may not expand textually specified 
qualifications).  The dissent in Thornton agreed that states cannot add qualifications of any 
sort under Article II, see 514 U.S. at 861 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (conceding that 
“individual States have no ‘reserved’ power to set qualifications for the office of 
President”), and arguably would have recognized equal protection limitations on the 
addition of ownership requirements to congressional qualifications.  Cf. Turner v. Fouche, 
396 U.S. 346, 361-64 (1970) (disallowing Georgia freeholder requirement for school board 
on Equal Protection grounds). 
 370. See, e.g., Hellman v. Collier, 141 A.2d 908, 912 (Md. 1958) (invalidating Maryland 
district residence requirement). 
 371. See, e.g., Shub v. Simpson, 76 A.2d 332, 341 (Md. 1950) (disallowing Maryland 
loyalty oath requirement as an impermissible additional qualification). 
 372. See, e.g., Application of Ferguson, 294 N.Y.S.2d 174, 177 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1968) 
(requiring New York to include otherwise qualified convicted felon on Senate ballot). 
 373. See, e.g., Schaefer v. Townsend, 215 F.3d 1031, 1039 (9th Cir. 2000) (ruling that 
California cannot require that candidates for the House of Representatives be residents of 
their district when filing nomination papers). 
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well as voter registration requirements374 under the Qualifications Clauses.  
If the state’s condition constitutes a qualification, then it is invalid pure and 
simple. 
Modern ballot fees, however, are not technically conditions of holding 
office.  They instead tend to qualify only ballot access.  One who does not 
or cannot pay the fee will not have her name printed on the state’s official 
ballot.  One might still run as a write-in candidate, an independent, or in 
some other way secure federal elected office.  Viewed in this way, ballot 
fees are like any other procedural device that is used to manage ballots.  
And because procedural devices, like signature collections,375 are valid, so 
too are filing fees.376 
The argument that ballot fees are permissible procedures as opposed to 
unconstitutional qualifications is certainly plausible.  Article I, after all, 
expressly delegates to the states the power to regulate the “Times, Places 
and Manner of holding Elections.”377  Article II likewise presupposes a 
state’s power, through its legislature, to prescribe procedures for appointing 
its allotted “Number[s] of Electors.”378  Even though states cannot add 
qualifications, they clearly have the power, absent congressional pre-
emption,379 to prescribe the proper procedures for filling a federal elected 
                                                          
 374. See, e.g., Campbell v. Davidson, 233 F.3d 1229, 1236 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
a Colorado voter registration requirement for House of Representatives candidates violates 
the Qualifications Clause). 
 375. The Eleventh Circuit in Cartwright v. Barnes, for example, concluded that 
Georgia’s signature collection requirement for congressional primaries constituted a 
permissible procedure, rather than an impermissible qualification.  304 F.3d 1138, 1139 
(11th Cir. 2002). 
 376. Applying similar reasoning to that found in Cartwright, the Third Circuit in Biener 
v. Calio sustained Delaware’s $3,000 filing fee for the Democratic House primary.  361 
F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 2004).  Because the fee was tied to the primary system, the court found it 
was designed “to keep Delaware’s ballots manageable.”  Id. at 212.  Further, the court noted 
that there was no meaningful way to distinguish the petitioner’s argument about filing fees 
from signature collection and that “the logical consequences of [this] argument would 
jeopardize states’ use of signature requirements.”  Id. 
 377. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.  “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections 
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature 
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as 
to the Places of choosing Senators.”  Id.  James Madison  
illustrated the procedural focus of the Elections Clause by noting that it covered 
‘[w]hether the electors should vote by ballot or vivâ voce, should assemble at this 
place or that place; should be divided into districts or all meet at one place, sh[oul]d 
all vote for all the representatives; or all in a district vote for a number allotted to 
the district. 
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 833 (1995) (citing Farrand, supra note 
264, at 240). 
 378. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.  “Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the 
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of 
Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress.”  Id. 
 379. Article I, Section 4 directs that “Congress may at any time by Law make or alter 
such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.  
While Article II, Section 1 provides no similar power, it would seem that Congress also has 
the authority to regulate the procedures surrounding presidential elections.  See, e.g., Oregon 
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office.  If ballot fees are procedures, they would thus seem secure.  
The Supreme Court in Thornton, however, made clear that the matter of 
qualifications is not form over substance.380  Qualifications that states 
camouflage in ballot garb are still qualifications.381  The facts of Thornton 
attest to the Court’s willingness to look beyond a ballot condition’s 
procedural façade.  In Thornton, Arkansas did not prevent long-term 
incumbents from holding federal office.382  Rather, it only excluded their 
names from official ballots.383  Because incumbents’ names could be 
written in, Arkansas argued its ballot restriction was not a substantive 
“legal bar to service.”384  Like the primary restrictions sustained in Storer v. 
Brown,385 where California prohibited “sore losers” from running in 
general elections and required that independent candidates collect 
signatures to garner space on election ballots,386 Arkansas claimed that the 
limitation it placed on incumbents was procedural.387  Thus, Arkansas 
argued that its restriction was no more a qualification than any other 
electoral hurdle.388 
The majority in Thornton was not persuaded.389  It worried about states 
avoiding the strictures of Article I by “dress[ing] eligibility to stand for 
                                                                                                                                      
v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124 (1970) (noting that “it is the prerogative of Congress to 
oversee the conduct of presidential and vice-presidential elections . . . . It cannot be 
seriously contended that Congress has less power over the conduct of presidential elections 
than it has over congressional elections.”) (footnote omitted).  Regardless of whether such 
power exists, Congress has not seen fit to regulate directly the use of ballot fees in either 
congressional or presidential elections.  Instead, it merely requires those states covered by 
section 5 of the Federal Voting Rights Act to pre-clear any changes to their ballot fees with 
the Attorney General.  See generally Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186 (1996) 
(holding that the Attorney General must pre-clear delegation fees imposed by the Virginia 
Republican Party). 
 380. See 514 U.S. at 831 (holding that Arkansas’ ballot access restriction was actually a 
qualification for holding congressional office and therefore it violated the Qualifications 
Clauses). 
 381. See id. (concluding that states cannot undermine the principles of the Qualifications 
Clauses by creating allegedly procedural ballot access restrictions). 
 382. Id. at 828. 
 383. Id. 
 384. Id. 
 385. 415 U.S. 724 (1974). 
 386. The Court in Thornton summarized California’s primary law as one that 
required candidates affiliated with a qualified party to win a primary election, and 
required independents to make timely filing of nomination papers signed by at least 
five percent of the entire vote cast in the last general election.  The code also 
denied ballot position to independents who had voted in the most recent primary 
election or who had registered their affiliation with a qualified party during the 
previous year. 
514 U.S. at 828. 
 387. Id. 
 388. Id. 
 389. See id. at 829 (asserting that Arkansas’ amendment was not analogous to the 
constitutional ballot restriction in Storer and instead represented an indirect attempt to 
violate the Qualifications Clauses). 
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Congress in ballot access clothing.”390  Cases like Storer, it found, merely 
demonstrated that states could draw up “procedural regulations”391 that 
delineated “how these electors shall elect—whether by ballot, or by vote, or 
by any other way.”392  Hence, states can enact “evenhanded restrictions that 
protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself,”393 as well 
as those designed to “avoid[] ‘voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, or the 
presence of frivolous candidacies.’”394  Rules that “dictate electoral 
outcomes, . . . favor or disfavor a class of candidates, or . . . evade 
important constitutional restraints,”395 in contrast, are impermissible under 
Article I, Section 4.  Substance is crucial.  Ballot restrictions, like 
Arkansas’s,396 that are intended to mimic impermissible qualifications by 
“handicapping a class of candidates”397 are qualifications nonetheless. 
Because Arkansas’ ballot access restriction was “undertaken for the twin 
goals of disadvantaging a particular class of candidates and evading the 
dictates of the Qualifications Clauses,”398 the majority in Thornton had 
little difficulty concluding that it constituted a qualification.399  “[E]ven 
if . . . incumbents may occasionally win reelection as write-in candidates, 
there is no denying that the ballot restrictions will make it significantly 
more difficult for the barred candidate to win the election.”400  Arkansas 
intended rotation and succeeded in handicapping incumbents.401  The Court 
easily unmasked this sort of ballot manipulation as a substantive 
                                                          
 390. Id. (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 872 S.W.2d 349, 357 (Ark. 1994)). 
 391. See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 832-33 (rebuffing petitioners’ argument that Article I, 
Section 4, Clause 1 of the Constitution (the Elections Clause) provides states with the power 
to exclude classes of candidates from federal office and instead finding that the Elections 
Clause only affords states the authority to create “procedural regulations”). 
 392. Id. at 833 (quoting 4 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 71 
(J. Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836)). 
 393. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 834 (citation omitted).  Rules designed to “maintain[] the 
integrity of the various routes to the ballot” are generally valid.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 394. Id. (quoting Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194-95 (1986)). 
 395. Id. at 833-34. 
 396. Arkansas conceded, for the most part, that the “intent behind [it’s restriction was] to 
prevent the election of incumbents.”  Id. at 830. 
 397. Id. at 836. 
 398. Id. at 835 (footnote omitted). 
 399. See id. at 836 (asserting that Arkansas’ measure violated the Constitution because it 
indirectly imposed a qualification for Congress that the Constitution does not establish).  
The majority correctly dismissed the dissent’s complaint that Arkansas only intended the 
ballot restriction to “level the playing field.”  Id.  Arkansas may have been trying to level 
the playing field, but it was doing so to force rotation.  For this same reason, the availability 
of free write-in space to candidates who do not wish to pay a filing fee does not transform 
the fee into a ballot access procedure.  It does not mean that fees are necessarily 
qualifications either.  The most that can be said is that the availability of write-in space does 
not resolve the matter. 
 400. Id. at 831. 
 401. See id. at 830 n.43 (providing that in over 1,300 Senate elections since 1913 only 
one write-in candidate has won and in over 20,000 House elections since 1900 only five 
write-in candidates have won). 
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qualification rather than an evenhanded procedure.402 
Were states to demand ballot fees without allowing candidates any 
alternative mode of winning election, Thornton’s application and result 
would be clear, at least if one agrees that office fees constitute 
impermissible qualifications.403  Under such circumstances, ballot fees 
would in fact be office fees, since no candidate who refused to pay could be 
elected to office.   
Moreover, the offer of write-in space, on either the primary or general 
ballot, is obviously insufficient to insulate the use of qualifications for 
ballot access after Thornton.404  For ballot fees to survive Thornton, then, at 
bare minimum the state must make available a non-monetary alternative 
that does not make it “significantly more difficult for the barred candidate 
to win.”405 
The question turns to what alternatives might satisfy Thornton’s 
command.  The Third Circuit in Biener v. Calio406 concluded that 
Delaware’s $3,000 ballot fee did not constitute an impermissible 
qualification because Delaware afforded candidates a “choice.”407  
Extrapolating from a previous Third Circuit decision rejecting a 
Qualifications Clause challenge to the Federal Hatch Act,408 which requires 
that candidates for federal elective office resign from public employment, 
the court in Biener concluded that a “candidate financially able to pay a 
filing fee, but unwilling to do so, is not being subjected to an impermissible 
                                                          
 402. More recently, the Supreme Court in Cook v. Gralike employed this same analysis 
to invalidate Missouri’s attempt to inform voters of candidates’ opposition to rotation.  
Missouri sought to place this information on the ballot next to candidates’ names.  531 U.S. 
510, 514 (2001).  The Court concluded that this type of “scarlet letter” was impermissible 
under Article I.  Id. at 525-27.  Rather than a procedure, it was designed to influence the 
electoral outcome.  Id. at 526-27. 
 403. See supra notes 325-349 and accompanying text. 
 404. The same result can arguably be reached under the Equal Protection Clause.  In 
Lubin v. Panish, the Supreme Court invalidated California’s primary fee under the Equal 
Protection Clause, in part, because it also applied to write-in candidates.  415 U.S. 709, 722 
(1974).  California thus provided no non-monetary alternative.  The Court also opined, in 
dicta, that a free write-in alternative would likewise prove insufficient: 
The realities of the electoral process . . . strongly suggest that “access” via write-in 
votes falls far short of access in terms of having the name of the candidate on the 
ballot . . . . [A]lthough we need not decide the issue, the intimation that a write-in 
provision without the filing fee . . . would constitute “an acceptable alternative” 
appears dubious at best. 
Id. at 719 n.5. 
 405. 514 U.S. 779, 831 (1995). 
 406. 361 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 407. See id. at 212 (holding that Delaware’s filing fee was not a qualification for a 
candidate who could afford to pay the fee because the candidate could choose whether or 
not to pay it). 
 408. See Merle v. United States, 351 F.3d 92, 97 (3d Cir. 2003) (rejecting Merle’s claim 
that the Hatch Act violates the Qualifications Clause because it does not bar a potential 
candidate from running for federal office but instead bars potential candidates from 
continuing to work as state or federal employees). 
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wealth requirement.”409  After all, both laws “allow[] a citizen a choice.”410  
Distilled to its essence, the Biener court concluded that so long as a 
candidate has a choice, any choice,411 a ballot fee cannot be an 
impermissible qualification.412 
Biener’s suggestion that any choice allows states to skirt the 
Qualifications Clauses is certainly questionable.  Thornton, after all, 
rejected Arkansas’s claim that the availability of write-in space somehow 
saved its ballot restriction.413  The lesson of Thornton is that states, at a 
minimum, must offer incumbents a realistic chance of winning office.414  
Because the possibility of winning write-in campaigns is clearly not 
enough, states must allow incumbents access to the ballot.  Anything less 
would make it “significantly more difficult” for incumbents to win.  This is 
not to say that all ballot routes must be identical.  But it does make clear 
that routes that render success significantly less likely will not suffice.   
Of course, most states today that charge ballot fees provide some sort of 
non-monetary alternative.415  Several provide outright waivers for 
indigents:  most authorize signature collection.  Are either of these 
sufficient to insulate ballot fees from attack under the Qualifications 
Clauses? 
Because indigence exceptions by definition are not available to all 
candidates,416 they would not seem to offer the realistic alternative 
Thornton demands.  For those candidates who are financially able, after all, 
indigence waivers offer no alternative at all.417  In Thornton, remember, 
                                                          
 409. 361 F.3d at 212. 
 410. Id. 
 411. The only choice Biener had, after all, was to pay the fee or not run for office.  The 
Biener court’s conclusion that he had a viable choice, id., thus seems to fail under its own 
terms. 
 412. The court relied on Merle, which sustained the Federal Hatch Act’s “resign to run” 
law.  351 F.3d at 97.  The court in Biener observed that “a ‘resign to run’ law may force the 
prospective candidate to make a choice between federal employment and running for 
elective office, but does not constitute an ‘additional qualification for the office of United 
States Representative.’”  361 F.3d at 212 (citing Merle, 351 F.3d at 97).  The court’s 
decision in Merle is surely correct; “resign to run” laws do not offend the Qualifications 
Clause.  Not because of any choice, but simply because the Framers did not reject this type 
of limitation.  Indeed, the Incompatibility Clause prohibits officers of the United States from 
serving in Congress.  The Framers thus envisioned Hatch Act-type limitations. 
 413. 514 U.S. 779, 831 (1995) (rebuffing Arkansas’s argument that its restriction is 
constitutional because write-in candidates have considerably less chances of winning 
elections). 
 414. Id. 
 415. See supra notes 153-195 and accompanying text. 
 416. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 3103(d), (e) (1999) (limiting the non-monetary 
alternative to “indigents” who earned less than the qualifying amount for Federal SSI 
benefits). 
 417. Even when states make indigence exceptions available to any candidate willing to 
declare an “inability to pay,” few candidates use them.  Georgia’s 1996 congressional 
elections, for example, saw no candidates use its indigence alternative.  See Brown, supra 
note 112, at 1300 n.88 (noting that Georgia required candidates using the state’s signature 
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incumbents who had not served the stated number of terms, could still 
appear on Arkansas’s ballots.418  This did not prevent those incumbents 
ousted from Arkansas’s ballot from complaining, nor did it stop the 
Supreme Court from striking down Arkansas’s required rotation.419  Hence, 
if fees otherwise constitute qualifications, they cannot be saved by waivers 
afforded to only some.  For non-monetary alternatives to have any chance 
of rescuing fees, states must make them available to all candidates.  
Otherwise, those without the choice can bring Qualifications Clause 
challenges under the logic of Thornton.420 
Signature collection alternatives made available to all candidates421 have 
the best chance of pushing ballot fees past Thornton’s test.  Still, in order to 
offer candidates a true choice, signature collection cannot be made 
significantly more difficult than paying the required fee.  At minimum, 
Thornton would seem to require that the burdens imposed by ballot fees 
and non-monetary alternatives prove roughly proportional.  After all, write-
in space failed to impress the majority in Thornton because it rendered 
success substantially more difficult.  This increased difficulty made it clear 
that Arkansas favored rotation over incumbency, so much so that the use of 
rotation to limit the ballot was the equivalent of a qualification.  Likewise, 
measures that coerce candidates to pay fees to qualify for ballots reflect a 
clear property preference.422  Assuming that office fees constitute property 
qualifications,423 this sort of ballot preference would not seem to survive 
Thornton. 
My purpose here is not to attempt a correlation between fees and 
signatures that demonstrates where dramatic disparities exist.424  (Suffice it 
                                                                                                                                      
alternative to swear to an “inability to pay”).  For a variety of reasons, not the least of which 
is political viability, candidates understandably shy away from admitting indigence.  See 
generally Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 525-26 (2001) (observing that “scarlet letters” can 
affect electoral outcomes). 
 418. 514 U.S. at 830. 
 419. See id. at 831 (holding that Arkansas’ contested amendment violated the 
Qualifications Clauses, even though it provided ousted candidates the possibility of a write-
in campaign,  because it significantly decreased their chances of winning). 
 420. Further, indigence waivers can be the equivalents of dreaded “scarlet letters,” which 
make it difficult for candidates to win.  See Cook, 531 U.S. at 525-26 (observing that ballot 
notations describing candidates’ positions on rotation amounted to impermissible “scarlet 
letters”).  Election can be difficult once a candidate has admitted indigence.  See Brown, 
supra note 112, at 1300-01 (discussing why candidates rarely want to use indigence 
exceptions or non-monetary alternatives conditioned on indigence). 
 421. See supra notes 164-165 and accompanying text. 
 422. This is true regardless of whether the fee is imposed by the state or a party.  Ballot 
fees established or set by either of the two major parties are still subject to constitutional 
challenge under the Equal Protection Clause, and thus presumably under any other 
constitutional provision—including the Qualifications Clauses.  See supra notes 69, 151, 
312, 369, and 404 and accompanying text. 
 423. See supra notes 325-369 and accompanying text. 
 424. See Brown, supra note 112, at 1295-96 (searching for rough proportionality 
between fees and signature collections). 
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to say that many states that use signature collections as alternatives to 
ballot fees set the number of signatures much higher than that demanded by 
states using signature collection alone.)425  Rather than debate where states 
cross the line from choice to coercion, my argument here is that ballot fees 
of any sort—even when joined with realistic and reasonable signature 
collection alternatives—are impermissible under Articles I and II. 
I confess that this argument, at first blush, seems ambitious.  Ballot fees, 
after all, have been used for over a century.  Still, the logic of Thornton, 
which holds that states cannot use ballots to supplement the qualifications 
spelled out in Articles I and II, inevitably leads to this result.  It is 
important to note that the Supreme Court in Thornton did not rule that 
realistic electoral alternatives for excluded incumbents necessarily would 
have saved Arkansas’s ballot access law.426  It instead stated that “even 
if . . . incumbents may occasionally win reelection as write-in 
candidates, . . . an amendment with the avowed purpose and obvious effect 
of evading the requirements of the Qualifications Clauses by handicapping 
a class of candidates cannot stand.”427  Because it was clear that Arkansas 
sought to achieve an impermissible end—rotation—its ballot restriction 
would have been invalid notwithstanding realistic alternatives.  Thornton 
holds that ballot access laws that are designed to limit who holds federal 
office, as opposed to how candidates run for office, are not exempt from 
Articles I’s and II’s full reach.428  Thus, a state’s attempt at adding 
qualifications by way of ballot access is invalid even if coupled with 
reasonable non-qualification alternatives. 
In Thornton, of course, Arkansas was admittedly interested in preventing 
incumbents from running.429  It was thus easy to conclude that Arkansas 
                                                          
 425. See id. at 1302-06 (describing signature level requirements of states that do not 
alternatively require fees and comparing them with signature level requirements of states 
that charge fees).  California, for example, requires that House candidates collect 3,000 
signatures, which dwarfs the 1,000 signature model used by most non-monetary access 
states.  CAL. ELEC. CODE § 8106(a)(2) (West 2003); see Brown, supra note 112, at 1305-06 
(“[P]ure signature states tend to require substantially fewer signatures [than fee-charging 
states].  Most [pure signature] states require 1000 or less.  Many states require 500 or less.  
All but one state require less than 1500 signatures.”) (footnotes omitted).  Florida and 
Georgia’s experiences in 1996 help prove this point.  Both of these states charged 
candidates significant fees.  Notwithstanding that candidates were allowed to collect 
signatures, they almost always paid the fees.  See Brown, supra note 112, at 1299-1301 
(describing Georgia and Florida’s experiences prior to 1996).  This suggests that the 
signature collection requirements in fee-charging states are too onerous.  Perhaps because of 
this realization, Florida reduced its signature collection requirement from three percent of 
the eligible electorate to one percent in 1999.  1999 Fla. Sess. Laws ch. 99-318. 
 426. 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
 427. Id. at 831. 
 428. See  id. (arguing that ballot access restrictions which limit who can run for Congress 
would reduce the Qualifications Clauses to a mere formalism). 
 429. See  id. (stating that Arkansas’ declared purpose for the ballot restriction evaded the 
Qualifications Clauses). 
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camouflaged rotation in ballot access garb; it clearly intended the 
amendment to restrict who rather than how.  Uncovering a dominant 
purpose behind America’s ballot fees, in contrast, is more difficult.  States 
use ballot fees for a host of reasons.  In addition to preventing non-
propertied candidates from holding federal office, ballot fees produce 
income,430 deter frivolous candidates,431 test candidates’ seriousness,432 
limit the size of ballots,433 help minimize voter confusion,434 perpetuate 
incumbencies,435 facilitate party control of candidacies,436 and discourage 
minorities from running.437 
Of course, states today are not willing to admit to all of these 
justifications.  Admitting to racial or socio-economic animus can prove 
constitutionally disastrous.  Although perhaps not as obvious, so too is 
claiming the need to raise revenue to finance elections.438  The Supreme 
Court in Lubin and Bullock rejected charging fees for fiscal purposes.439  
While perpetuating incumbencies is constitutionally permissible, political 
reasons caution against its use as a justification for ballot fees.  
Consequently, modern justifications for ballot fees tend to coalesce around 
deterrence:  a need to limit ballot size by deterring frivolous candidates and 
testing the seriousness of others. 
Because these stated objectives mirror those supporting non-monetary 
access mechanisms, like signature collections, some argue that the lots of 
both must be considered together.  Under this argument, the demise of 
ballot fees necessarily spells the end of petitions and signature 
                                                          
 430. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 147-48 (1972) (explaining that Texas 
argued its fees were necessary to defray the costs of elections); see Brown, supra note 112, 
at 1298-99 (discussing Florida’s reasons for charging fees including “raising revenue to 
support various electoral projects”). 
 431. See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 714 (1974) (describing California’s reason 
for charging fees as deterring “frivolous or otherwise nonserious candidates”). 
 432. See, e.g., Bullock, 405 U.S. at 144-45 (noting Texas’s reason for charging fees as 
limiting ballots to serious candidates). 
 433. See, e.g., Green v. Mortham, 155 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 1998) (observing that 
Florida’s interest in regulating and limiting its ballot justified its fee). 
 434. See Lubin, 415 U.S. at 715 (stating that states have an interest in using fees to avoid 
voter confusion); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 732 (1974) (accepting that states have a 
legitimate interest in limiting the ballot size to help avoid voter confusion). 
 435. See Brown, supra note 112, at 1307 (stating that a “more subtle argument, and one 
not often freely conceded, is that ballot access limitations perpetuate incumbency”).  
 436. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text (noting that parties favored large fees 
to foster their control over newly created primaries). 
 437. See supra note 126 (discussing Louisiana’s racially charged reasons for adopting 
primaries and authorizing ballot fees). 
 438. The Court in Lubin and Bullock rejected the use of fees for financial gain.  See 
supra notes 145-152 and accompanying text. 
 439. Lubin, 415 U.S. at 713, 716-18 (rejecting state interest in charging fees to cover 
costs of elections); Bullock, 405 U.S. at 147-49 (rejecting Texas’s argument that filing fees 
were necessary to pay for the costs of administering the primaries so that it did not have to 
burden taxpayers (voters) with the costs). 
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collections.440  Only caucuses and conventions would remain.  This 
concern, however, is grossly exaggerated.  Fees are problematic because 
they bear all of the hallmarks of property qualifications.  Signatures, in 
contrast, have little in common with property.  Sure, candidates can use 
money to facilitate signature collection.  But outside the actual signing of a 
petition or casting of a vote, this is true with any non-monetary condition.  
Like it or not, property is power.  It allows candidates to run advertisements 
and connect with their electorates.  None of this proves that signatures and 
money are fungible or interchangeable.441  
More importantly, non-monetary nominating procedures, unlike property 
qualifications, were recognized and embraced by the Founding generation.  
The Framers demonstrated this through the creation of the Electoral 
College442 and the not uncommon use of pre-election exclusion 
procedures.443  Both processes required that candidates obtain votes in 
preliminary stages before proceeding to a more general election.  Gathering 
signatures is more like garnering votes than it is owning property.444 
Assuming the best intentions on behalf of fee states, the true 
constitutional question is simply whether a qualification, such as owning 
property or possessing the capacity to pay a fee, can be used to deter 
candidates.  If not, can qualifications like these be used in conjunction with 
some non-qualification alternative to achieve this same goal?  The answer, 
I believe, is “no” on both counts.  Resolution of the first problem posed is 
easy.  Allowing states to use otherwise impermissible qualifications to limit 
ballots by deterring candidates would eviscerate the Qualifications Clauses.  
Qualifications, by definition, limit the electoral field.  They necessarily 
discourage and deter.  Like paying a fee, forcing candidates to purchase 
                                                          
 440. The Third Circuit in Biener v. Calio, for example, fretted over this proverbial 
slippery slope:  “the logical consequences of Biener’s argument would jeopardize states’ use 
of signature requirements.”  361 F.3d 206, 212 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 441. The same is true of other ballot limitations that are not specifically tied to property.  
“Sore loser” laws, for example, are not impermissible under the Qualifications Clauses, and 
are not impacted by my thesis.  See, e.g., Van Susteren v. Jones, 331 F.3d 1024, 1027 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (sustaining California’s requirement that candidates in party primaries cannot be 
affiliated with other parties for one year).  Justice Thomas’ complaint in Thornton that the 
majority’s Qualifications Clauses analysis threatened to “open up whole new vistas for 
courts,” including challenges under the Qualifications Clauses to campaign finance, 
redistricting, and racial discrimination, appears to be the proverbial parade of horribles.  514 
U.S. 779, 925-26 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
 442. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text. 
 443. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text. 
 444. True, candidates can hire agents to collect signatures, which means that to some 
extent signature collections and money can be exchanged.  See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 
414, 428 (1988) (holding that supporters and candidates have a constitutional right to hire 
petition circulators to collect signatures).  But this is often the case with money; it can make 
any task easier.   This does not mean, however, that votes and dollars are fully 
interchangeable.  Although a voter can hire a chauffeur to take him to the voting place, he 
cannot hire the chauffeur to cast a vote. 
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real estate in order to qualify for official ballots would certainly deter some 
and seriously test others.  It appears safe to say, however, that Thornton 
precludes states from using impermissible qualifications in this manner. 
The second question demands more attention, but leads to the same 
answer.  Because Thornton did not involve a realistic alternative, 
incumbents in Arkansas had no real choice.  When candidates are given a 
free choice between property and procedure, the argument goes, no 
qualification is being added to Article I.  Only necessary conditions, after 
all, constitute true qualifications.  So long as candidates can freely choose 
either the additional qualification or a procedural alternative, the 
Constitution has no complaint.  Because procedures can be imposed 
anyway, a property option is a favor to candidates.  Those who freely 
choose the option have voluntarily waived their Article I objections.   
The response to this argument is threefold.  First, it wrongly assumes 
that structural guarantees found in Articles I and II are subject to individual 
control.  The Court has often observed that because the Constitution’s 
structural limitations “serve institutional interests that [individuals] cannot 
be expected to protect,” “notions of waiver and consent cannot be 
dispositive.”445  What is important is the Framers’ choice, and not that of 
individual candidates. 
Second, it ignores the fact that governmental favors extended to 
particular classes of candidates are objectionable under Thornton.  Waiving 
procedural requirements for propertied candidates is just such a favor.    
Last, the “free choice” argument proves too much.  If accepted—if  
states can add qualifications that were rejected by the Framers by offering 
procedural options—no clear logic would appear to prevent them from 
using a similar technique to subtract qualifications the Framers 
demanded.446  That one problem involves a constitutional floor and the 
other a ceiling is a distinction without a difference.  The Qualifications 
Clauses’ requirements are fixed either way according to the majority in 
Thornton.447  Because the Qualifications Clauses’ demands are both 
minimal and maximal as far as the states are concerned, precluding a 
constitutionally qualified candidate from running would appear no more or 
less proper than allowing a constitutionally unqualified candidate to run.  
                                                          
 445. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986) 
(“When these Article III limitations [on the separation of power] are at issue, notions of 
consent and waiver cannot be dispositive because the limitations serve institutional interests 
that the parties cannot be expected to protect.”). 
 446. For example, a state might condition congressional ballot access on a candidate’s 
either being a resident (Article I’s minimal demand, see, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 
(providing three qualifications for House candidate:  he or she must be at least twenty-five 
years of age, a citizen of the United States for at least seven years, and a resident of the state 
he or she represents)), or collecting 1000 signatures from registered voters. 
 447. See supra notes 282-301 and accompanying text. 
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Articles I and II prohibit both possibilities.   Unless one is willing to 
conclude that the Qualifications Clauses are more concerned about minimal 
qualifications than maximal qualifications, a distinction Thornton was not 
willing to draw, the existence of options should thus validate both additions 
and subtractions, or neither.448 
  Of course, few would be willing to allow states to subtract from the 
Qualifications Clauses’ commands in this manner.  The Supreme Court in 
Thornton may have disagreed over Arkansas’ authority to add 
qualifications, but all of the Justices agreed that states cannot subtract from 
Article I’s minimal age, residence, and citizenship requirements.449  It is 
thus difficult to imagine allowing states to convert these minimal 
qualifications into mere options.  Because subtractions via choices cannot 
be countenanced, neither can additions.  Regardless of whether realistic and 
reasonable non-monetary alternatives are allowed, ballot fees for federal 
office violate Articles I and II. 
CONCLUSION 
I recognize that filing fees are preferred by candidates and bureaucrats in 
many states because of their relative ease and convenience.  Even though 
signature collection is a more precise mechanism for screening out 
frivolous and testing serious candidates, filing fees enjoy the benefit of 
administrative efficiency.  Administrative ease, however, seldom justifies 
overriding important rights. Nor is it a sound basis for circumventing the 
Constitution’s structural guarantees.  Like it or not, the Framers felt that 
property was irrelevant to a person’s ability or capacity to hold federal 
elected office.  Whether viewed as an individual right or structural 
                                                          
 448. Even should a state cast a fee as an option instead of a command—for example, 
“one thousand signatures are required, but in recognition of the fact that candidates often 
hire signature collectors, one can always just pay a $3,000 filing fee” —the resulting choice 
must prove invalid.  Consider another example, a state law that requires congressional 
candidates to collect signatures, but allows candidates who reside in the district—an 
otherwise impermissible qualification—an automatic place on the ballot:  “one thousand 
signatures are required for ballot access, but in recognition of the fact that district residents 
are better known, they automatically qualify.”  Such a choice is surely invalid.  Regardless 
of which one is deemed a command and which one is offered as an alternative, the choice is 
still between an impermissible qualification and a permissible procedure.  It is no different 
from saying that district residence is required in the absence of collecting 1,000 signatures.  
Unless one is willing to sustain such a requirement, courts must also rule that a choice 
between fees and signatures is invalid. 
 449. See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 869 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas argued: 
The Qualifications Clauses do prevent the individual States  from abolishing all 
eligibility requirements for Congress . . . . [T]he people of each State need some 
guarantee that the legislators elected by the people of other States will meet 
minimum standards of competence.  The Qualifications Clauses provide that 
guarantee:  They list the requirements that the Framers considered essential to 
protect the competence of the National Legislature. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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guarantee, this constitutional conclusion should not be circumvented by 
appeals to bureaucratic necessity. 
Though I confess a lack of empirical data proving this point, I suspect 
that ballot fees discourage a larger percentage of “have-nots” than “haves” 
from running for federal office.450  This unfortunate tendency is detrimental 
not only to the deterred candidates, but also to the American political 
system.  Who knows what candidates and ideas might emerge from a free 
political market?  It may be that a property-poor candidate has the innate 
wisdom and political acumen to solve the nation’s budget woes.  Or 
perhaps another Lincoln would emerge to unite a divided country.  
America is worse off, I believe, if ballot fees keep even one property-poor 
candidate from maximizing his or her talents in the political arena. 
A common response to my Lincoln suggestion is that surely this sort of 
candidate, if truly motivated, would gather the needed property (or 
propertied support) to satisfy a fee requirement.  Lincoln, after all, only 
started poor.  By the time he won election to Congress (and again to the 
White House) he was a successful, propertied lawyer.451  The argument, I 
think, is short-sighted.  It ignores the fact that “[w]e are rarely smart 
enough to set about on purpose making the discoveries that will drive our 
economy and safeguard our lives.”452  Achievements, instead, are quite 
often inadvertent, accidental and unconnected to wealth. 
The late Carl Sagan used the life and discoveries of James Clerk 
Maxwell to illustrate this point.453  Maxwell, who was born in Scotland in 
1831,454 was instrumental to our current understandings of electrical and 
magnetic vectors,455 without which our present mechanical gadgetry, like 
the computer on which this Article was prepared, would not operate.  
Sagan points out that even the world’s most wealthy nation, with its 
government’s vast store of scientists and resources, could not have willed 
Maxwell’s discoveries:  “If Queen Victoria had ever called an urgent 
                                                          
 450. In an empirical study I conducted a decade ago, I discovered that States charging 
more than $1,336 to run for congressional (House) office had less than half of the candidates 
found in States charging $100 or less.  See Brown, supra note 112, at 1312 tbl. 1 
(illustrating that in the 1994 and 1996 congressional elections states charging more than 
$1,336 to run for office had 1.56 candidates per primary versus 3.31 candidates per primary 
for states charging less than $100 to run).  I am thus convinced that ballot fees deter 
candidates.  Whether these deterred candidates are more or less affluent is anyone’s guess.  
Simple reason, however, suggests that they would tend to be less affluent. 
 451. See DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 111-15 (1995) (describing Abraham 
Lincoln’s election to the Thirtieth Congress as a Whig from Illinois). 
 452. CARL SAGAN, THE DEMON-HAUNTED WORLD:  SCIENCE AS A CANDLE IN THE DARK 
397 (1996). 
 453. See id. at 385 (detailing James Clerk Maxwell’s natural scientific acumen, 
beginning at the age of two when he used a tin plate to bounce an image of the sun off 
furniture). 
 454. Id. 
 455. Id. at 393. 
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meeting of her counselors, and ordered them to invent the equivalent of 
radio and television, it is unlikely that any of them would have imagined 
the path . . . .”456  Like it or not, money alone cannot uncover truth.  Money 
may be a facilitator of sorts—everyone, after all, must eat—but society 
should not rely upon it as a great gatekeeper of knowledge and ideas. 
Meaningful discovery flows from talent, curiosity, and hard work.  
Money is important, but it should not be a fixation.  When it is, when 
government corrupts all scientists with promises and demands of riches, the 
likes of Maxwell might be lost.457  Similarly, people can not expect 
political truth and progress to flow exclusively from America’s financial 
faucet.  Telling political candidates that they must have (or raise) a fixed 
sum of money to be credible enough to enjoy the privilege of running for 
office is akin to legislating scientific discovery.  Both interfere with the free 
marketplace of ideas.  Neither works. 
I suspect that critics will fret over the demise of ballot fees.  Without 
fees, after all, loons will run for office, ballots will explode, and ordered 
government will collapse.  Truth be had, none of these horribles is likely.  
About one-third of the states presently rely on non-monetary means to 
restrict their ballots,458 and to my knowledge none of these has experienced 
debilitating electoral problems.  In fact, the volume of candidates who run 
in House primaries, on average, is not noticeably different in fee and 
signature states.459 
Far from disaster, an end to ballot fees offers several salutary 
                                                          
 456. Id. at 394.  Sagan continues:  “Meanwhile, on his own, driven only by curiosity, 
costing the government almost nothing, himself unaware that he was laying the ground for 
the Westminster Project, ‘Dafty’ [Maxwell] was scribbling away.”  Id.  Not only did 
Maxwell not know where his studies might lead, had the government known it “would have 
been telling him what to think about and what not, impeding rather than inducing his great 
discovery.”  Id. 
 457. Sagan comments: 
Members of Congress and other political leaders have from  time to time found it 
irresistible to poke fun at seemingly obscure scientific research proposals that the 
government is asked to fund. . . . I imagine the same spirit in previous 
governments—a Mr. Fleming wishes to study bugs in smelly cheese; a Polish 
woman wishes to sift through tons of Central African ore to find minute quantities 
of a substance she says will glow in the dark; a Mr. Kepler wants to hear the songs 
the planets sing. 
Id. at 398.  He concludes: 
These discoveries and a multitude of others that grace and characterize our time, to 
some of which our very lives are beholden, were made ultimately by scientists 
given the opportunity to explore what in their opinion, under the scrutiny of their 
peers, were basic questions in Nature . . . . Fundamental research, research into the 
heart of Nature, is the means by which we acquire the new knowledge that gets 
applied. 
Id. 
 458. See supra notes 154-156 and accompanying text. 
 459. See Brown, supra note 112, at 1312-13 tbls. 1, 2 (demonstrating that, on average, 
about 1.9 candidates run in each House primary in fee states and 1.8 candidates run in each 
House primary in signature states). 
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possibilities.  First, signature collection requirements in those states that 
currently rely on ballot fees will likely be reduced.  States that eschew fees 
commonly require far fewer signatures than those that do not, and an end to 
ballot fees will force states to reconsider seldom-used, non-monetary 
access mechanisms.  Once incumbents are turned to non-monetary 
access—and discover that collecting hundreds and thousands of signatures 
is hard—the number of signatures required throughout the United States 
will be reduced.  Second, while an end to ballot fees will not necessarily 
increase the raw number of candidacies, it will lead to a larger percentage 
of non-affluent, property-poor challengers.  This then will lead to the most 
important development, a more complete (and competitive) cross-section of 
ideas in the political marketplace. 
